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CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND 
JOHN BINGHAM’S THEORY OF CITIZENSHIP 
Rebecca E. Zietlow* 
In the Twentieth Century, Congress’ power to enact civil rights 
legislation, and make it privately enforceable against states and private 
parties, became widely recognized as one of the most important 
functions of the federal government.  Yet in recent years, the Supreme 
Court has greatly restricted this function with its rulings restricting 
Congress’ commerce power1 and its power to enforce the Equal 
Protection Clause under Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.2  
Cases such as United States v. Morrison,3 Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v. Garrett4 and Kimel v. Florida Board of 
Regents5 have left Congress in a vacuum, without any clear source of 
power to enact civil rights legislation that is enforceable against the 
 
*Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law.  Thanks to Richard Aynes, Michael 
Curtis, Paul Finkelman, James Fox, Joseph Slater and Bryan Wildenthal for their comments on this 
project.  Thanks to Dean Aynes and the University of Akron School of Law for organizing this 
excellent symposium, and to all of the participants in the symposium for informing me and inspiring 
me.  Finally, thanks to the University of Toledo College of Law for providing me with a summer 
research grant so that I could work on this project. 
 1. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the civil rights 
provision of the Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
(striking down the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990). 
 2. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Congress 
lacks the power to abrogate state’s immunity to suit for violations of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act); Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (striking down the civil rights provision of the Violence Against 
Women Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that Congress lacks the 
power to abrogate state’s immunity to suit for violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act as applied to states and establishing a “congruence” and “proportionality” test to 
measure the validity of Section 5 legislation). 
 3. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (deciding Civil rights provision of the Violence Against Women Act 
was beyond both Congress’ commerce and Section 5 enforcement powers). 
 4. 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act that 
abrogated states’ sovereign immunity was beyond Congress’ Section 5 enforcement power). 
 5. 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act that 
abrogated states’ sovereign immunity was beyond Congress’ Section 5 enforcement power). 
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states or private parties.  These rulings have many scholars wondering 
where Congress can turn when it wants to enact civil rights legislation in 
the future.6  Largely overlooked in this discussion is a possible solution 
to the problem.  This solution is another clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—the Citizenship Clause—and the rights of federal 
citizenship,7 which its Framers intended to be a broad font of federal 
rights that would be enforceable by Congress. 
John Bingham, the chief author of Section one of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, had a broad vision of national citizenship and the rights 
that adhered thereto.  This essay argues that the Citizenship Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment reflects his view and provides a source of 
congressional power to define and protect civil rights against 
infringement by states and private parties.  Congressional debates about 
one of the most contentious issues leading up to the Civil War, the status 
of fugitive slaves and the rights (if any) of free people of color, reflect 
fundamental disagreements between Northern and Southern members of 
Congress over the existence and meaning of the federal rights of 
citizenship.  After the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Reconstruction era, civil rights statutes reflect the fact that the Thirty-
ninth Congress adopted an expansive vision of the rights of federal 
citizens and that Congress embraced its role as protector of those rights. 
Unfortunately, after Reconstruction, Congress’ expansive vision of 
the rights of federal citizenship faded.  In the civil rights era of the 
1960s, Congress relied on other sources of power such as the Commerce 
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.  In upholding the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, the Court relied solely on Congress’ commerce power, 
tying its legislation to economic theory rather than principles of equality 
 
 6. See, e.g., James G. Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment versus the Commerce Clause: Labor 
and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2002) 
(arguing that as a result of Morrison, enacting human rights protections may now fall outside the 
scope of congressional power altogether); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by 
Law: Federal Anti-Discrimination Legislation after Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L. J. 441, 502 
(2000) (“[T]he decisive question raised by Morrison’s appeal to federalism is whether the nation 
has retreated from the view that a central mission of the federal government is to protect individuals 
against discrimination by public and private actors.” ). 
 7. But see Rebecca E. Zietlow, Belonging, Protection and Equality: The Neglected 
Citizenship Clause and the Limits of Federalism, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 281 (2000); William J. Rich, 
Taking “Privileges or Immunities” Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. 
L. REV. 153 (2002) (advocating congressional enforcement of the privileges or immunities of 
citizenship); James W. Fox, Re-readings and Mis-readings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or 
Immunities and Section 5 Enforcement Powers, 91 K.Y.L.J. 67 (2002) (discussing congressional 
enforcement of the privileges or immunities of citizenship). 
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and human rights.8  In retrospect, Congress’ choice to rely on the 
commerce power was arguably unfortunate because it raised the specter 
of unlimited federal police power without any significant limiting 
principles.9  The breadth of the Court’s Commerce Clause rulings has 
come back to haunt Congress now, with the Court placing new limits on 
the commerce power in Lopez and Morrison primarily because it saw 
that power as overly threatening to state sovereignty.10  At the same 
time, in Kimel and Garrett the Court limited Congress’ power to enforce 
the Equal Protection Clause because the Court felt that its judicial power 
was threatened by congressional interpretation of that Clause.11  Finally, 
this essay will explain why the Citizenship Clause and the rights of 
federal citizenship may enable Congress to get around the roadblocks to 
civil rights legislation erected by the Court in Morrison, Kimel and 
Garrett. 
I.  BINGHAM’S VISION OF THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP 
John Bingham envisioned federal citizenship as a guarantee that 
certain fundamental rights of citizens should be uniform throughout the 
United States, and that states should be unable to deprive federal citizens 
of those rights.  Bingham also had a broad vision of the substantive 
rights encompassed in the concept of federal citizenship.  Well before 
the Reconstruction era, Bingham stated that the rights of citizenship 
included: 
[T]he equality of all to the right to live; to the right to know; to argue 
and to utter, according to conscience; to work and enjoy the product of 
their toil . . . the charm of that Constitution lies in the great democratic 
ideals which it embodies, that all men, before the law, are equal in 
respect of those rights of person which God gives and no man or state 
may rightfully take away.12 
The Fourteenth Amendment reflects Bingham’s expansive view of 
federal citizenship rights and gives Congress the power to protect these 
rights.  However, prior to the Civil War, this view was quite 
 
 8. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Title II of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Pope, supra note 6.  But see Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: 
Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L. J. 619 (2001) (critiquing the false dichotomy 
between women’s rights and economic rights). 
 9. Pope, supra note 6.  But see Resnik, supra note 8 (noting the link between economic 
empowerment and women’s empowerment). 
 10. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. 
 11. Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 457. 
 12. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859). 
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controversial and gave rise to heated congressional debates over the 
relationship of citizenship between the state and federal governments.  
Although there was widespread agreement about what it meant to be a 
“citizen,” the disagreement centered around the question of who could 
become a citizen13 and the role, if any, that the federal government 
played in defining and protecting citizenship rights. 
Prior to the Civil War, Bingham’s vision of the rights of federal 
citizenship was a minority view.  Congressional debates during the 
antebellum era reveal that the meaning of citizenship rights was 
extremely controversial, repeatedly sparking disputes between northern 
and southern representatives.  These disputes centered on the status of 
free blacks and the question of whether or not Blacks could become 
citizens.  Bingham and other antislavery constitutionalists believed that 
the federal Constitution authorized northern states to bestow citizenship 
upon free blacks, and provided for those rights to be protected by the 
federal government.14  On the other hand, other members of Congress, 
primarily from slaveholding states, adamantly believed that only states 
could bestow citizenship rights, and that the federal government played 
absolutely no role in this arena.  Lurking behind these debates was the 
problem of  fugitive slaves.  While representatives from slaveholding 
states were happy to use federal power to force northern states to return 
fugitive slaves, they resisted any interpretation of federal power that 
might allow northern states to free fugitive slaves and immunize them 
from southern laws.15 
A.  Pre-Civil War Congressional Debates Over the Meaning of 
Citizenship 
Prior to the Civil War, Congress did not play any role in the 
definition and enforcement of individual rights.  In Barron v. City of 
Baltimore,16 the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights did not limit 
state governments.  This ruling recognized a sphere of autonomy for the 
states in the area of individual rights.17  Equally important was that the 
 
 13. Douglas G. Smith, Citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
681, 691 (1997). 
 14. See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 
YALE L. J. 57, 71 (1993). 
 15. See Paul Finkelman, States Rights North and South in Antebellum America, in AN 
UNCERTAIN TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 125 (Kermit L. 
Hall & James W. Ely, Jr., eds. 1989). 
 16. 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (holding that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause applied only to the 
federal government). 
 17. During Reconstruction, some members of Congress, including John Bingham, did not 
4
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Constitution did not expressly give Congress the power to legislate in 
the area of individual rights.  The Bill of Rights does not include any 
congressional enforcement provisions.18  With the possible exception of 
the 1789 Judiciary Act,19 the only major piece of federal legislation 
affecting individual rights enacted by Congress during this era was the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.20  The Fugitive Slave Act prohibited non-
slave states from freeing slaves and required them to return fugitive 
slaves to their owners in slave states.21 The Court upheld congressional 
power to enact the Fugitive Slave Act in the case of Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania,22 notwithstanding the fact that the Fugitive Slave Clause 
has no enforcement provision, in part because the Court saw the Clause 
as protecting the fundamental right to own slaves.23 
Thus, prior to the Civil War, congressional authority in this area 
was not exercised to champion civil rights.  Instead, Congress used its 
power to prohibit free states from conveying minimal human rights to 
the enslaved people that lived within Congress’ jurisdiction.24  A review 
 
believe that Barron was good law, and argued that the Bill of Rights did apply to the states. See 
Aynes, supra note 14, at 69; MICHAEL K. CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 83 (1986) (Republicans rejected Barron v. Baltimore during 
the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment); AKHIL R. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION 
AND RECONSTRUCTION 145-62 (1998) (discussing the “Barron contrarians”). 
 18. This was a major concern of John Bingham who supported the Fourteenth Amendment in 
large part because it would empower Congress to enact legislation protecting the rights of federal 
citizens.  See infra, notes 120-26 and accompanying text. 
 19. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).  The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the federal courts and bestowed 
diversity jurisdiction upon them, creating a federal forum for the vindication of rights.  See ROGERS 
M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997) (arguing 
that the diversity jurisdiction in Article III reflected a view of the federal government as the 
protector of some citizenship-based rights). 
 20. 1 Stat. 305 (1793). 
 21. This statute was based on Congress’ power to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause U.S. 
CONST. art. IV, §2, cl. 3. 
 22. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615 (1842).  Prigg was one of the Court’s broadest readings ever of 
congressional power, owing to the fact that the Fugitive Slave Clause lacked a congressional 
enforcement mechanism.  See Akhil R. Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term Foreword: The 
Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 69 (1999).  Congress later enacted an even 
more broadly sweeping Fugitive Slave Act in 1950, which the Court upheld in Ablemon v. Booth, 21 
How. 526.  Congress relied on Prigg when it enacted the later, broader, law.  Amar, supra at 70. 
 23. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 569.  See Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 
RUTGERS L. J. 605, 608 (1993). 
 24. Although some members of Congress considered freed slaves to be citizens, see infra 
notes 25-28 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court found that they were not United States 
citizens, and that indeed no people of African descent could be United States citizens, in the 
infamous case of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).  The Citizenship Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended in part to overturn the Court’s ruling in Scott.  See infra, 
notes 49-51 and accompanying text.  Ironically, in the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the Court 
identified a fundamental right of slaveholders to recover their fugitive slaves as one of the sources 
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of congressional debates during that time reveals two conflicting visions.  
On one hand, some members of Congress believed that citizenship rights 
were determined by states, without any national character.  
Paradoxically, those same members of Congress supported federal 
power in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which enlisted federal 
magistrates to aid states in denying rights of citizenship to free blacks as 
well as slaves. 
On the other hand, some members of Congress believed that the 
rights of citizenship had a national character, guaranteed by the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution.  
They understood that Clause, which provides that “The Citizens of each 
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the 
Several States,” to prohibit states from taking away from people the 
rights of citizenship that had been bestowed upon them by other states.  
These members of Congress were influenced by opponents of slavery 
such as Joel Tiffany, an abolitionist lawyer from Ohio.  In his influential 
1849 book, called Treatise on the Unconstitutionality of Slavery,25 
Tiffany argued that “the object of the national government was to protect 
the natural and inalienable rights of each citizen.”26  Moreover, in his 
influential treatise, Kent’s Commentaries, Chancellor Kent defined free 
blacks born in the United States as citizens.27  Many Republicans in the 
39th Congress expressed views similar to those expressed by Tifanny 
and Kent when they debated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil 
Rights legislation.28  But even at the time that those books were 
published, well before the Civil War, some members of Congress agreed 
with them.  In their view, the fact that a person was a citizen of one state 
meant that his basic rights could not be taken away from him by another 
state. 
1.  Mr. Hoar’s Journey 
The role of federal citizenship and the rights that inhered therein, 
were central to congressional debates over the so-called “Negro 
 
of congressional power to enact legislation assisting them to do so.  Prigg, 41 U.S. at 581-83. 
 25. JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 
(1849).  See CURTIS, supra note 18. 
 26. See CURTIS, supra note 18, at 43 (citing TIFFANY, supra note 25, at 55). 
 27. 2 CHANCELLOR KENT, KENT’S COMMENTARIES, (1840).  John Bingham quoted 
Chancellor Kent in support of this proposition in the debates over the admission of Oregon.  See 
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 892 (1859).  See also TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO 
LAW 131 (Da Capo Press 1972) (2d ed. 1844) (indicating that “all” people born in the United States 
since the Declaration of Independence were citizens). 
 28. CURTIS, supra note 18, at 42. 
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Seamen’s Acts,” laws which southern port states enacted in the late 
1840s to authorize the arrest of free blacks that entered their states.  In 
1849, Representatives Charles Hudson and George Ashmun, whigs from 
Massachusetts, decried two such laws, enacted by the states of South 
Carolina and Louisiana.29  The laws were enacted in response to the 
arrest of Denmark Vesey in Charleston, a free black man from the North 
who allegedly came to Charleston in order to foment a rebellion.30  
Hudson and Ashmun were particularly concerned about those laws 
because their state, Massachusetts, had a large shipping industry that 
employed many sailors.31  They argued that the South Carolina law 
violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV because it 
authorized the imprisonment of free citizens from their state.32 
“In the state of Massachusetts the black man was as much a citizen 
as a white man,” said Hudson, complaining that if one of those citizens 
of color were to go to South Carolina, “his person, and perhaps his life, 
may be in danger” solely because of the color of his skin.33  Similarly, 
Ashmun explained that his problem with the South Carolina law was 
that it was enforced against “our citizens.”34  Thus, even as they 
recognized that the rights of the freed citizens of color adhered to state, 
not federal, citizenship, they articulated a national view of citizenship 
that would protect the rights of state citizens, once those rights were 
bestowed upon them, against interference by other states.  They believed 
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV required comity 
between the states, comity that included respecting the rights that each 
state bestowed on its own citizens. 
Representative Hudson believed that the South Carolina law 
violated the U.S. Constitution.  He wanted the Supreme Court to decide 
whether it was constitutional or not, but South Carolina had resisted 
federal review.35  Hudson accused South Carolina of avoiding Supreme 
Court review through the doctrine of interposition, a belief that states 
could decide for themselves whether or not a law was constitutional.36  
 
 29. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 418 (1849). 
 30. See CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 418 (1849) (statement of Representative Robert 
Rhett of South Carolina). 
 31. See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. (1850) (statement of Senator Davis of 
Massachusetts). 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several states.”)  See CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 418-19 (1849). 
 33. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 418 (1849). 
 34. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 419 (1849). 
 35. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 419 (1849). 
 36. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. (1849).  In the case of Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. 
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This concern was shared by a number of members of Congress, who 
supported federal intervention in this area.  Some articulated their 
concern by telling the story of Samuel Hoar, a minister from 
Massachusetts who traveled to South Carolina for the purpose of 
challenging the constitutionality of the South Carolina law.37  Rather 
than arrest Mr. Hoar and his companions, which could have set up the 
possibility of a legal challenge, South Carolina officials ordered Mr. 
Hoar to leave town.38 
Members of Congress who advocated a broad view of federal 
citizenship rights often mentioned the story of Mr. Hoar to illustrate their 
concerns about southern laws that they believed violated the 
constitutional principles of citizenship.39  Mr. Hoar’s journey serves as a 
powerful metaphor for what northern advocates of national citizenship 
rights did not like about the treatment of their citizens by southern 
states—that northern citizens could have their most basic human rights 
taken away from them by southern states solely due to the color of their 
skin.40  They also resented the disrespect for the northern states’ 
conveyance of citizenship rights that this practice reflected.41 
In response to the citizenship based advocacy of their northern 
colleagues, southern members of Congress argued that the Constitution 
did not protect people of color from other states because those people 
were not, and could not be, citizens of the United States.  For example, 
Senator Andrew Butler of South Carolina stated that “colored 
persons . . . are a species of persons having such rights only as may be 
conferred upon them by state jurisdiction; they have no federal 
eligibility, or federal recognition, as citizens of the United States.”42  
 
Cas. 493 (1823), Justice Johnson, riding circuit, declared the South Carolina Act unconstitutional.  
However, South Carolina defied that decision and continued to enforce the law.  See Finkelman, 
supra note 16. 
 37. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. (1850) (statement of Senator John Davis of 
Massachusetts). 
 38. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. (1850) (statement of Senator Henry Clay of 
Kentucky). 
 39. See, e.g., CONG GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866) (Trumbull); CONG. GLOBE, 31st 
Cong., 1st Sess. App. 123 (1850) (Davis); CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1654 (1850) 
(Winthrop); CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 419 (1849) (Ashmun); CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 
2d Sess. 418 (1849) (Hudson). 
 40. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1654 (1850) (statement of Senator Robert 
Winthrop of Massachusetts). 
 41. CURTIS, supra note 18, at 45–46.  The main difference between radical abolitionists and 
most Republicans was that the radicals thought that slaves were citizens.  Id.  During the civil war, 
more and more Republicans started believing that slaves were citizens and the line between the two 
all but disappeared.  Id. 
 42. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. App. 288 (1850). 
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Butler explained that his understanding was that a state can give a 
colored person a “status” of being free.  However, that “status” would 
not govern in other states and instead would depend on the local law of 
the state.  “Their condition must be assimilated under the law that 
operates on them.”43 
That the southern view of citizenship dominated in Congress prior 
to the Civil War was evident from the fact that shortly after Hudson’s 
and Ashmun’s dissertation on the rights of citizenship, Congress refuted 
them by enacting the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.  The 1850 Act 
responded to reluctant northern officials who often refused to enforce the 
federal law and to some state legislatures that enacted state laws 
prohibiting the implementation of the 1793 Act.44  The 1850 Fugitive 
Slave Act provided for the appointment of a federal commissioner in 
every county of the nation to enforce it, and authorized federal marshals 
and, federal troops if necessary, to aid in the capture of fugitive slaves.  
“The law created exclusive federal power to enforce the Fugitive Slave 
Clause and placed the prestige of the national government behind the 
rendition of fugitive slaves.”45 
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 not only deprived the northern 
states of the power to shelter fugitive slaves, but, in a blow to the 
sovereignty of the northern states, also superceded reluctant northern 
officials and enlisted federal “help” to ensure that the task would be 
carried out.  As a result of this federal law, northern free people of color 
were in danger not only when they traveled to southern states, but also in 
the north, because the weak evidentiary standards of the Federal Act 
placed them in danger of being kidnapped in the northern state in which 
they lived.46  The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 dramatically illustrates the 
fact that the proponents of strong rights of citizenship were a distinct 
minority in Congress prior to the Civil War. 
2.  The Oregon Debates 
Like the majority of those in Congress at the time, the Supreme 
Court adopted the southern view of the Privilege and Immunities Clause 
of Article IV.  In Dred Scott v. Sanford,47 the Court held that the clause 
did not require a slave state to recognize the laws of a non-slave state 
 
 43. CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. App. 288 (1850). 
 44. See Finkelman, supra note 23, at 664. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 623.  Such a scenario happened leading up to the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania.  41 
U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).  See Finkelman, supra note 23, at 613. 
 47. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
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which purportedly had freed Mr. Scott from slavery.  Significantly, the 
Court articulated a broad view of the rights that federal citizens enjoy.48  
However, the Court excluded all African Americans from enjoying those 
rights, ruling that no person of color could be a citizen of the United 
States.49  In his majority opinion, Justice Taney differentiated between 
state and United States citizenship, and held that being a citizen of one 
state does not entitle one to the rights and privileges of another state.50  
The Dred Scott ruling deprived northern states of the power to bestow 
meaningful citizenship rights on freed blacks because those rights would 
only extend as far as that state’s borders.  Notwithstanding the Dred 
Scott ruling, the broad vision of federal citizenship rights expressed by 
Hudson and Ashmun survived and flourished among other members of 
Congress in the years approaching the Civil War.  During this period, 
Bingham was a strong proponent of an expansive approach to the rights 
of federal citizenship. 
In 1858, members of Congress debated whether or not to admit the 
territory of Oregon into the Union as a state.  At issue was a provision of 
the Oregon State Constitution that would have allowed Oregon to 
exclude free people of color, and prohibit them from owning property, 
entering into contracts, and filing suit in Oregon state court.51  Some 
members of Congress opposed Oregon’s admission because they 
believed that the provision of the Oregon Constitution violated the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.52  Central to this debate 
was a dispute over the meaning of citizenship and the extent to which 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV limited the power of 
some states to take away rights of citizens of other states.  This debate, 
which occurred shortly before the Civil War, foreshadowed the 
congressional debate over the rights of citizenship during 
Reconstruction. 
John Bingham was chief among advocates of national citizenship 
 
 48. Id. at 417 (describing the rights of citizenship as “the right to enter every other State 
whenever they pleased, singly or in companies, without pass or passport . . . the full liberty of 
speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold 
public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went.”). 
 49. Id. at 404.  Indeed, Justice Taney listed the rights of citizenship to illustrate his point that 
Blacks could not possibly be entitled to so many rights, and thus could not be citizens.  Id. at 416-
17.  See James W. Fox Jr., Citizenship, Party and Federalism: 1787-1882, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 421, 
484 (1999). 
 50. Scott, 60 U.S. at 405. 
 51. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 402 (1858) (Bingham).  Some other northern states 
already admitted into the Union, including Illinois and Missouri, also had constitutional provisions 
prohibiting the entry of free blacks into the state.  ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION (1988). 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §2, cl. 1. 
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rights.  In 1858, he explained, “[i]t has always been understood that the 
citizens of each state of the Union are ipso facto citizens of the United 
States.”53  Like those before him, Bingham believed that the fact that one 
state had recognized a person as its citizen triggered the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, preventing any other state from taking 
away the rights of citizenship, conveyed to him by his home state.54  Of 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, he opined, “this guaranty of the 
Constitution of the United States is senseless and a mockery, if it does 
not limit state sovereignty and restrain each and every State from closing 
its territory and courts of justice against citizens of the United States.”55  
This reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause directly conflicted 
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s reading of the Clause in Dred Scott.56  
However, like a number of other Republicans at the time, Bingham 
simply disregarded the Dred Scott ruling as being incorrect.57 
Along the same line, Senator William Fessenden, a Republican 
from Maine, explained that his state had free colored citizens and that he 
could not agree to admit Oregon as a state because Oregon would not 
allow citizens of his own state to visit.58  Fessenden said: 
By the laws of Maine, and under the constitution of the state of Maine, 
free Negroes are citizens . . . just as much citizens of the state of Maine 
as white men. . . .  I cannot vote for the admission of any State with a 
constitution which prohibits any portion of my fellow citizens of my 
own state from the enjoyment of the privileges which other citizens of 
 
 53. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. (1858).  Similarly, Representative Fessenden of 
Maine expressly disavowed the validity of the Dred Scott decision, stating that he did not believe 
that Dred Scott accurately stated the law.  CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. (1858). 
 54. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 984 (1858). 
 55. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 984 (1858). 
 56. Scott, 60 U.S. at 405. 
 57. For example, criticizing the Dred Scott decision in a speech before Congress in April, 
1860, Bingham defiantly exclaimed: 
With Jefferson, I deny that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter on all questions of 
political power, and assert that the final arbiter on all such questions is the people . . . 
While I could condemn armed resistance to any decision of the Supreme Court . . I 
would claim for myself, in common with my fellow-citizens, the right to question their 
propriety, to denounce their injustice, and to insist that whatever is wrong therein shall 
be corrected. 
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong, 1st Sess. 1839 (1860).  See also CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 
402 (1858) (Fessenden) (stating that he did not believe that the Dred Scott opinion “accurately 
stated the law.”). 
 58. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 402 (1858).  Representative Clark Cochrane of New 
York also argued that the exclusion provision of the Oregon Constitution violated the privileges and 
immunities clause.  CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess.  1964 (1858). 
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the state have.59 
To Bingham, national citizenship meant more than simply the right 
to enter the borders of other states.  The concept of national citizenship 
was a central component of Bingham’s ideology.60  Bingham believed 
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV protected the 
rights of national, rather that state, citizenship.  In a speech during the 
debate over the admission of Oregon, Bingham explained that the 
Privileges and Immunities of Article IV belonged to citizens “in” the 
several states, not “of” the several states.61  This interpretation of Article 
IV “implies the existence of substantive national rights which states may 
not deny.”62 
Bingham and others were especially concerned about Oregon’s 
provision that would have denied people of color access to state courts.  
Bingham explained that he could not consent to “mutilate and 
destroy . . . the Constitution of my country” by supporting a bill which 
allows a state to deny “the right to a fair trial in the courts of justice.”63  
Echoing Bingham’s concerns, Senator Henry Wilson, Republican of 
Massachusetts,64 protested that the prohibition on access to the courts 
would have prevented a free citizen of color from Massachusetts from 
filing suit if he was injured in Oregon.65  Others agreed that the bar on 
access to the courts violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause.66 
Of course, Bingham’s view of the rights of citizenship did not go 
unopposed.  Some opponents simply cited Dred Scott to refute his 
 
 59. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1964 (1858). 
 60. See Aynes, supra note 14, at 69.  According to Dean Aynes, the other components of 
Bingham’s ideology included the belief that the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens protected by 
Article IV included all of the rights in the Bill of Rights, that the Bill of Rights were enforceable 
against the states even prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that Congress 
lacked the power to enforce the Privileges and Immunities of Citizenship because Article IV lacked 
a congressional enforcement provision.  Id. 
 61. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859); see also Aynes, supra note 14, at 69. 
 62. Aynes, supra note 14, at 70. 
 63. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859). 
 64. Wilson, Henry, 1812-1875, Biographical Directory of the United States Congress 1774-
Present, available at http://bioguide.congress.gov/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).  Wilson served as a 
senator from January 31, 1855 to March 3, 1873, when he resigned to become Vice President under 
President Ulysses S. Grant.  Id. 
 65. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1966-67 (1858). 
 66. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 974-75 (1859) (Representative Dawes 
arguing that the provision preventing people of color from entering contracts, owning property and 
suing in courts violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause); CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 
at 980 (1859) (Representative Clark Cochrane arguing the same).  See also CONG. GLOBE, 35th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1966-67 (1858) (Senator Wilson), CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 974-75 
(1859) (Representative Dawes). 
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points.67  Others pontificated that states had the power to exclude 
whomever they chose, and that the Privileges and Immunities Clause did 
not prevent them from doing so.68  For example, Representative Linus 
Comins, a Republican from Massachusetts, while stating his “regret” 
about the exclusion provision, argued that the exclusion provision was 
not a reason to prohibit Oregon from becoming a state because it was 
consistent with the west’s treatment of free blacks.69  Along the same 
vein, Senator Steven Douglas, a Democrat from Illinois who later ran 
against Abraham Lincoln in the presidential campaign of 1860, pointed 
out that Illinois had a similar provision excluding free people of color, 
and argued that Illinois, like Oregon, had a sovereign right to do so.70  
“Whether she does so or not is a question for herself, and not for any 
other state to interfere with.”71  Democrats continued to articulate a 
cramped reading of the rights of citizenship in the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause during the debate over the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.72 
Bingham’s and Fessenden’s views are significant because of the 
role that those men played in drafting the Reconstruction Amendments.  
Both were members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction in the 
39th Congress and Bingham was the principle draftsman of the first 
section of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Moreover, by 1866 most 
Republicans shared Bingham’s and Fessenden’s view that free blacks 
were citizens73 and “believed in a body of national rights that states were 
required to respect.”74  These views on national citizenship and the rights 
that adhere thereto were reflected in the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Civil Rights legislation that Congress enacted during Reconstruction. 
 
 67. See, CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. (1858) (Representative Clark, of Missouri, 
relying on Dred Scott as authority for his position that blacks are not, and cannot be citizens of the 
United States). 
 68. See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965 (1858) (Senators Trumbull and Douglas); 
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 974 (1858) (Representative Comins). 
 69. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. at 974 (1859). 
 70. Other northern states also excluded free Blacks, including Ohio. 
 71. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1965 (1858). 
 72. CONG GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1122-23, 1156 (1866) (Rogers).  They argued that the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV merely protected citizens of each state while 
temporarily visiting any other state.  See CONG GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1269 (1866) (Kerr).  
See CURTIS, supra note 18, at 81. (“Republican speakers supported the bill on grounds of a 
paramount national citizenship and a national body of fundamental privileges and immunities; the 
Democratic doctrine was more in keeping with accepted Supreme Court doctrine.”). 
 73. CURTIS, supra note 18, at 46. 
 74. Id. at 48. 
13
Zietlow: Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003
NEWZEITLOW.DOC 7/28/03  11:50 AM 
730 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:717 
B.  The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The themes of the congressional debate over the meaning of 
citizenship in some way played themselves out during the Civil War.  
Central to that War was the question of “whether a citizen owed his 
primary allegiance to the national or state government.”75  When the 
Confederate states seceded from the Union, they asserted their sovereign 
right to treat people as they chose, regardless of any protections in the 
United States Constitution that might otherwise have existed, in the most 
dramatic fashion possible.  The conflict between state autonomy and 
federal power was resolved in favor of federal power to bestow national 
citizenship rights when the Union won the War.76  Following the War, 
Bingham’s vision of national citizenship and the rights that adhered 
thereto became an animating force behind the Reconstruction 
Amendments and the Civil Rights statutes of the Reconstruction Era.77 
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that 
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State 
wherein they reside.”78  Its companion, the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, provides further that “No state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States.”79  The Framers intended the Citizenship Clause to clarify the 
fundamental relationship between the state and federal governments at 
the end of the Civil War and to serve as the font of civil rights that 
inhered from that relationship.80  The Citizenship Clause states strongly 
 
 75. Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 872 (1986).  See also Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, 
The Idealogical Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 235, 263 (1984) 
(“Both the expansion of national power and the growing significance of national allegiance became 
evident early in the war.”). 
 76. See Kaczorowski, supra note 75, at 873.  See also Farber & Muench, supra note 75, at 
277 (asserting that after the Civil War, “the concept of national citizenship became triumphant”); 
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 
1045, 1097 (2001) (“The Reconstruction Amendments were designed to create a new constitutional 
order in which state sovereignty would be limited by federal civil rights protections.”) 
 77. See CURTIS, supra note 18, at 54 (“To Republicans the great objects of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction were securing liberty and protecting the rights of citizens of the United States.”).  
See also SMITH, supra note 19, at 286 (arguing that the three constitutional amendments and six 
major civil rights statutes of the Reconstruction Era “compromised the most extensive restructuring 
of American citizenship”). 
 78. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. 
 79. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. 
 80. See James W. Fox Jr., Re-readings and Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or 
Immunities, and Section Five Enforcement Powers, 91 KY. L.J. 67, 145 (2002) (“[S]upporters 
understood the Fourteenth Amendment to enable Congress to enforce equality in a wide range of 
14
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and unequivocally that there is only one class of United States citizens; 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause clarifies that those citizens have 
certain rights that cannot be denied to them due to the very nature of 
their federal citizenship.81  The Clauses also reflect the re-structuring of 
the federalist system during Reconstruction, shifting the balance of 
power in favor of the federal government and away from the states, and 
making Congress the primary protector of civil rights.82 
Interestingly, the version of the Fourteenth Amendment that was 
approved by the House of Representatives did not contain the 
Citizenship Clause, which was added only upon debate in the Senate.  
After Senator Howard introduced the Amendment, Senator Benjamin F. 
Wade suggested an amendment to identify those whose privileges and 
immunities were protected.  That amendment was the Citizenship 
Clause.83  However, the Citizenship Clause was added late, not because 
it was not important, but because it reflected the understanding of the 
framers so widespread that those in the House felt that it was not 
necessary.84  For example, as discussed above, Bingham believed that 
 
public activity because such activities were themselves privileges of national citizenship.”).  The 
framers also intended the citizenship clause to overrule the Court’s decision in Dred Scott that freed 
slaves could not be citizens, and to establish birthright citizenship. 
 81. Prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress attempted to enforce 
federal civil rights through the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  However, some proponents of the Act 
feared that they lacked constitutional authority to enforce those rights.  The debate over Congress’ 
constitutional authority to enact the Civil Rights Act led to the drafting and ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a sound constitutional basis for the Act.  In effect, therefore, the 
Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act.  See Farber & Muench, supra note 
75, at 275 (“The general theory of the Civil Rights Act [of 1866] was that Congress had the same 
power to protect citizens at home [as abroad] . . . . [The framers] believed that the fourteenth 
amendment supplied the missing authority to protect basic human rights.”). 
 82. See Kaczorowski, supra note 75, at 866-67; Farber & Muench, supra note 75, at 277. See  
also J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2347 (1997) (“The citizenship 
clause is a second Declaration of Independence, announcing that equal citizenship would henceforth 
be available to all regardless of race or prior condition of servitude.”); Fox, supra note 49, at 425 
(“The framers of Reconstruction believed that, by making a clear statement about citizenship, 
federalism could assume its proper role in the service of citizens.”); see also Farber & Muench, 
supra note 75, at 236 (“The fourteenth amendment was intended to bridge the gap between positive 
law and higher law by empowering the national government to protect the natural rights of its 
citizens.”). 
 83. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768 (1866).  See also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess. 2890 (1866). 
 84. See CURTIS, supra note 18, at 91 (“So for Republicans the amendment was simply 
declaratory of existing constitutional law, properly understood.  They rejected Dred Scott and 
instead believed that all free persons born in the United States were citizens of the United States.”); 
SMITH, supra note 19, at 306 (The architects of the Civil Rights Act and Attorney General Edward 
Bates believed that native-born blacks were already citizens).  See also Richard L. Aynes, 
Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-
House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 649 (arguing that the Citizenship Clause was “added in 
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the freed slaves were already citizens of the United States, 
notwithstanding the Court’s ruling in Dred Scott, and did not need a 
constitutional amendment to make them so.85 
The Citizenship Clause was most likely added by the Senate as a 
result of a debate over whether Congress had the power to declare freed 
slaves as citizens in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  A number of Senators 
questioned whether Congress had the power to make such a declaration 
in light of the Court’s ruling in Dred Scott.  For example, Senator Peter 
Van Winkle of West Virginia, and a member of the Unconditional 
Unionist Party, asked where Congress had the power to make Africans 
citizens of the United States.86  Similarly, Senator Johnson of Maryland 
argued that Congress lacked the authority to create birthright citizenship 
because in slave states, slaves were not considered citizens even if they 
were born there.87  Other  oppoenents of Reconstruction countered that 
“enfranchisement of those unfit for republican citizenship” were 
antithetical to republicanism.88  The Citizenship Clause rejects this 
argument and firmly overrules Dred Scott, establishes birthright 
citizenship, and makes it clear that Congress has the power to protect the 
rights of federal citizens. 
Even though the Citizenship Clause was added late, its importance 
is reflected in the fact that it is the first clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  This is not surprising, given that early congressional 
discussion of the newly proposed Fourteenth Amendment emphasized 
the rights of citizenship.89  For example, Senator Fessenden of Maine, 
speaking for the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, stated that the goal 
of the Fourteenth Amendment was the equal participation of all in the 
rights of citizenship.90  Others wanted it to protect “the rights and 
privileges of citizens,”91 “the personal and natural rights of citizens,”92 
 
the Senate at the last moment to write into the Constitution the antislavery view that the Thirteenth 
Amendment granted citizenship along with freedom”). 
 85. See generally, CURTIS, supra note 18, at 91. 
 86. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866). 
 87. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1777 (1866) (Johnson) (“[W]hat doubt can there be 
but that if a State possessed the power to declare who should be her citizens before the Constitution 
was adopted that power remains now as absolute and conclusive as it was when the Constitution 
was adopted?”). 
 88. See SMITH, supra note 19, at 296. 
 89. CURTIS, supra note 18. (“In proposing his amendment, Bingham wanted to ensure that the 
provisions of article IV, section 2, were respected in each state.”). 
 90. Id. 
 91. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 868 (1866) (Newell). 
 92. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1032 (1866) (McClurg). 
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the “fundamental rights of citizens,”93 and the civil rights of citizens.94  
The primary function of the Fourteenth Amendment is defining and 
protecting the rights of federal citizens. 
C.  The Importance of Congressional Enforcement 
Perhaps most important to John Bingham was the change in the 
39th Congress’ vision of its own institutional role, in protecting the 
rights of its citizens, that is reflected in the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Prior to the Reconstruction Amendments, the Constitution did not 
contain a single provision assigning this role to Congress.  Additionally, 
the Bill of Rights does not contain any congressional enforcement 
provision.  In contrast, all of the Reconstruction Amendments contain 
congressional enforcement provisions, as does every post-
Reconstruction Amendment that expands individual rights.95  The 
Framers of the Reconstruction Amendments intended to bestow broad 
power on Congress to define and protect the rights of national 
citizenship by enacting civil rights legislation.96  The Fourteenth 
Amendment thus represents a major departure from the constitutional 
protections for individual rights prior to the Civil War in two significant 
respects—it protects those rights from infringement by the states and it 
names Congress as the principle enforcer of those rights.97 
Congressional power to enforce the rights of its citizens was a 
crucial component of Bingham’s theory of citizenship.98  Prior to the 
 
 93. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1295 (1866) (Wilson). 
 94. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1182 (1866) (Pomeroy). 
 95. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII (abolishing slavery and giving Congress the power to 
“enforce this article by appropriate legislation”); XIV; XV (prohibiting the federal government and 
states from denying the right to vote on account of race and giving Congress the power to “enforce 
this article by appropriate legislation”); XIX (prohibiting the denial of the right to vote on account 
of sex and giving Congress the power to “enforce this article by appropriate legislation”); XXIII 
(bestowing the right to vote for president on residents of the District of Columbia and giving 
Congress the power to “enforce this article by appropriate legislation”); XXIV (prohibiting the use 
of poll taxes as a voting qualification and giving Congress the power to “enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation”); XXVI (lowering the voting age to eighteen and giving Congress the power 
to “enforce this article by appropriate legislation”). 
 96. See Julius Chambers, Protection of Civil Rights: A Constitutional Mandate for the 
Federal Government, 87 MICH L. REV. 1599, 1604-05 (1989) (“The thirteenth and fourteenth 
amendments to the Constitution created a national citizenry, defined the rights of citizenship, and 
authorized the national government to protect those rights. . . . The framers of the Reconstruction 
amendments meant to vest the federal government the authority necessary to secure civil rights and 
to provide federal remedies when those rights were denied.”). 
 97. See Fox, supra note 49, at 512 (“Congress saw itself, and not the Court or the states, as 
the governmental branch best suited to define the particulars of citizenship.”). 
 98. Aynes, supra note 14, at 71. 
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Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham believed that the rights of federal 
citizenship had a substantive component, including the Bill of Rights, 
and that those rights were enforceable against the states.99  To Bingham, 
the problem was that those rights lacked a remedy because Congress 
lacked the power to enforce them.100  Two years before the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified, Bingham made his theory of enforcement 
clear, speaking in general terms about what was to become the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Bingham explained that this “general” 
amendment would give Congress the express power to enforce “the 
rights which were guarantied (sic) . . . from the beginning, but which 
guarantee unhappily has been disregarded by more than one state of this 
Union . . . simply because of want of power in Congress to enforce that 
guarantee.”101 
Ensuring congressional power to protect the rights of federal 
citizens was arguably the raison d’etre of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Congress had freed people from slavery, and given itself power to 
enforce those provisions, in the Thirteenth Amendment.102  Soon 
thereafter, many southern states attempted to perpetuate the institution of 
slavery in all but name by enacting laws commonly known as the Black 
Codes, which denied freed slaves the right to vote, to own property, to 
appear in court, and other basic rights of citizenship, treating them as 
second-class citizens.103  According to the Report of the Joint Committee 
on Reconstruction, these laws made it necessary for Congress to inquire 
into what it could do to secure the civil and political rights of freed 
slaves.104  The Committee recommended enacting a Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution to ensure congressional power to protect 
those rights.105 
 
 99. Id. at 70-71. 
 100. Id. at 71. 
 101. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 429 (1866). 
 102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 103. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Exec Doc. No. 2 (1865) (Schurz Report 
on Condition of the South; predicting that southern states would try to reinstate slavery-like 
conditions such as peonage); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (statement of Senator 
Trumbull).  See also Smith, supra note 13, at 752 (southern states used Black Code to make newly 
freed slaves into second class citizens); Fox, supra note 49, at 490 (noting the context of 
Reconstruction, where “real people had been denied basic human dignity and citizenship”).  See 
also John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1388 
(1992) (maintaining that when people were talking about abridging privileges or immunities in 
1866, they were mostly talking about the Black Codes). 
 104. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Report No. 112 (1866) (Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction) (proposing a Fourteenth Article of Amendment). 
 105. Id.  See also Farber & Muench, supra note 75, at 275 (“The general theory of the Civil 
Rights Act [of 1866] was that Congress had the same power to protect citizens at home [as 
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Simultaneously with the debate over the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Congress enacted a Civil Rights Act106 providing that “All citizens of the 
United States shall have the same right, in every State or Territory” to 
engage in real property transactions, make and enforce contracts, and 
have the right to “the full and equal benefit of the laws.”107  Some 
members of Congress believed that the Thirteenth Amendment was 
sufficient to give Congress power to enact the legislation needed to 
secure those rights.108  For example, Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, 
who served as both a Democrat and a Republican, argued that depriving 
a citizen of civil rights creates a badge of servitude and that prohibiting 
such a practice was within Congress’ power to enforce the Thirteenth 
Amendment.109  Similarly, Representative M. Russell Thayer, 
Republican of Pennsylvania, insisted that the Thirteenth Amendment 
and the Fifth Amendment gave Congress the power to enact the civil 
rights bill.110  While Bingham was a strong supporter of the 1866 Civil 
Rights Act, stating that he wanted the Federal Bill of Rights to be 
enforced “everywhere,”111 Bingham was one of few Republicans that 
thought Congress lacked the power to enact the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, absent the Fourteenth Amendment.112  Based in large part on 
Bingham’s concerns, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
eventually decided that enacting this Amendment would be the best 
approach to ensure the constitutionality of proposed civil rights 
legislation.113 
 
abroad] . . . [the framers] believed that the fourteenth amendment supplied the missing authority to 
protect basic human rights.”). 
 106. 14 Stat. 27 (1866) now codified at 42 U.S.C. §1982. 
 107. Id.  The original version considered by Congress also provided that all persons born in the 
United States would be citizens of the United States.  That portion of the bill was omitted after the 
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment made it unnecessary. 
 108. See Samuel Estreicher, Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The 
Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 
449, 452 (1974). 
 109. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-75 (1866). 
 110. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1152 (1866); CURTIS, supra note 18, at 79.  James 
Wilson, chair of the House Judiciary Committee, also thought that the Bill of Rights, and especially 
the Due Process Clause, gave Congress the power to pass the Civil Rights Bill before the  
Thirteenth Amendment.  He said that citizens of the United States were entitled to “certain rights” 
and being entitled to those rights, “it is the duty of the government to protect citizens in the perfect 
enjoyment of them.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (1866).  See CURTIS, supra note 18, 
at 81. 
 111. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866). 
 112. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866) (Representative Bingham) (arguing 
that Congress lacked the constitutional power to enact the Civil Rights Act); CURTIS, supra note 18, 
at 81. 
 113. See CURTIS, supra note 18, at 86. (pointing out that several congressmen observed that the 
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Many members of Congress argued that congressional power was 
necessary to ensure that those guarantees would be implemented.  For 
example, Senator Trumbull stated that ensuring congressional power to 
enforce the rights of citizenship was crucial because “[t]here is very little 
importance in the general declaration of abstract truths and principles 
unless they can be carried into effect, unless the persons who are to be 
affected by them have some means of availing themselves of those 
benefits.”114  Similarly, Congressman Ignatius Donnelly, speaking in 
favor of the proposed amendment, argued: 
Why should this not pass?  Are the promises of the Constitution mere 
verbiage?  Are its sacred pledges of life, liberty and property to fall to 
the ground through lack of power to enforce them?  Or shall that great 
Constitution be what its founders meant it to be, a shield and a 
protection over the head of the lowliest and poorest citizen in the 
remotest region of the nation?115 
In addition, William Lawrence of Ohio, a widely respected lawyer 
and former judge, argued that Congress had the incidental power to 
enforce and protect civil rights.116  Lawrence said: 
The Constitution declares these rights to be inherent in every citizen, 
and Congress has the power to enforce the declaration.  If it does not, 
then the declaration of rights is in vain, and we have a government 
powerless to secure or protect rights which the Constitution solemnly 
declares every citizen shall have.117 
That congressional enforcement power was predominant in the 
minds of the framers is evident from the fact that the first draft of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that John Bingham presented to Congress was 
not self-executing, but relied solely on congressional enforcement.118 
 
Fourteenth Amendment would eliminate any question about the power of Congress to pass the Civil 
Rights bill).  See also, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2498 (1866) (Broomall); CONG. GLOBE, 
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2511 (1866) (Eliot); 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH 
OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 447 (2002) (Section 5 “would 
be the justification for the sweeping measures that Congress adopted in its efforts to rebuild the 
South.”); Estreicher, supra note 108, at 498. 
 114. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866). 
 115. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 586 (1866). 
 116. See CURTIS, supra note 18, at 78. 
 117. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1835 (1866). 
 118. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).  It said only “The Congress shall have 
power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each state all 
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states, and to all persons in the several states 
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and property.”  Id.  (Presented to Congress by Bingham 
on Feb. 26, 1866).  In City of Boerne v. Flores, Justice Kennedy viewed the change in language as 
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Moreover, the framers had a very broad view of congressional 
power in mind when they enacted the enforcement provisions of the 
Reconstruction Amendments.  The Supreme Court’s broad interpretation 
of congressional power in McCulloch v. Maryland119 remained the 
standard on congressional enforcement power throughout the 
Antebellum Era, and the framers consciously invoked its broad meaning 
when they authorized Congress to enact “appropriate” legislation in 
Section five to enforce the rights established by Section one of the 
Amendment.120  The Court had relied on McCulloch in its broad reading 
of congressional power to legislate against the rights of fleeing slaves 
and their protectors in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.121  Throughout the 
ratification debates, Republican supporters of the Fourteenth 
Amendment referred to Prigg to argue that Section one of the 
Amendment, including the Citizenship Clause, gave Congress implied 
powers to protect freed slaves.122  Some framers even believed that 
Prigg meant that the Fourteenth Amendment was unnecessary because 
the existence of rights necessarily meant that Congress had the power to 
enforce them.123  The framers intended to turn Prigg on its head, 
 
proof that Congress did not intend to give itself broad enforcement power.  521 U.S. 507, 523-28 
(1997).  However, Kennedy’s point in Boerne is inconsistent with the overwhelming evidence that 
Congress intended to give itself broad enforcement power.  See infra, notes 121-29 and 
accompanying text. 
 119. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (finding that the “Necessary and Proper” Clause of Article 
I authorized Congress to enact any legislation that was “appropriate” to furthering a “legitimate 
end”).  “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which 
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the 
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”  Id. at 421. 
 120. See Amar, supra note 22, at 825 n.299. 
 121. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615 (1842) (upholding Congress’ power to enact a fugitive slave 
law pursuant to its Article IV enforcement powers, even though the Fugitive Slave Clause did not 
contain an enforcement provision, stating “[i]f indeed, the constitution guaranties the right . . . the 
natural inference certainly is, that the national government is clothed with the appropriate authority 
and functions to enforce it.”).  See Amar, supra note 22, at 69.  See also Finkelman, supra note 23, 
at 614 (arguing that “the structure of the Constitution, as well as nineteenth-century notions of 
Congressional power suggest that Congress may have lacked the power to enact the 1793 law”).  
See also id. at 658 (arguing that Justice “Story’s main concern in Prigg was to strengthen federal 
power at the expense of the states, in disregard of the rights of northern free blacks”).  Congress 
later enacted the more broadly sweeping Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, upheld by the Court in 
Ablemon v. Booth.  62 U.S. (21 How.) 526 (1858).  Congress relied on Prigg when enacting the 
later, more comprehensive law.  Amar, supra note 22, at 26, 70. 
 122. Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of 
Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109 YALE L.J. 115, 139 (1999). 
 123. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (1866) (Wilson); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess. 1153 (1866) (Thayer); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1270 (1866) (Thayer).  See 
also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866) (Lawrence).  See CURTIS, supra note 18, at 
82.  But see Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-
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protecting the rights of those freed from slavery with the very powers 
once used to enslave.124 
Finally, members of Congress during Reconstruction made it clear 
that they understood their Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power to 
be used primarily to define and protect the rights of citizenship.  For 
example, during the debate over the Civil Rights Enforcement Act of 
1871,125 Representative Shellaberger, Republican of Ohio who 
participated in the 1866 debates over the Amendment, asserted that the 
Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to “legislate directly 
for enforcement of such rights as are fundamental elements of 
citizenship.”126  Similarly, in 1872 Senator Matthew Carpenter, 
Republican of Wisconsin who joined Congress the year after the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, argued that the Amendment’s 
enforcement power “included the power to enforce national privileges 
and immunities, because the assertion of national citizenship and the 
mention of national privileges and immunities implied their 
existence.”127  Though these members of Congress may have disagreed 
about the extent of the rights of federal citizenship,128 they all accepted 
the view that the Fourteenth Amendment had given them the power to 
define and enforce those rights. 
II.  THE RIGHTS OF FEDERAL CITIZENSHIP 
What rights of federal citizenship did the framers intend to protect?  
To the framers, federal citizenship had both a structural and a 
substantive component.  Structurally, federal citizenship was intended to 
guarantee that the fundamental rights of citizenship would be uniform 
throughout the country.  The substantive meaning of citizenship rights is 
more difficult to discern.  The Privileges or Immunities Clause, which 
directly follows the Citizenship Clause, was at least intended to 
 
Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L. J. 435, 453-56 (1981). 
 124. This interpretation of Prigg is not necessarily inconsistent with the intent of the author of 
the opinion of the Court, Justice Story, who arguably saw Prigg primarily as a case about the power 
of Congress, not the extension of slavery.  See Finkelman, supra note 23, at 608 (describing Prigg 
as “a proslavery opinion written by a Justice personally opposed to slavery but driven by a desire to 
nationalize all law, including the law of slavery.”). 
 125. 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
 126. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 69 (1871).  See also, Fox, supra note 80, at 
127-28. 
 127. Fox, supra note 80, at 143 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 762 (1872)).  The 
statements of Senator Carpenter here are ironic, given that he served as counsel for the state of 
Louisiana in The Slaughter-House Cases.  83 U.S. 36 (1873); Id. at 142. 
 128. See id. at 137-48. 
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 4, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss4/5
NEWZEITLOW.DOC 7/28/03  11:50 AM 
2003] CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS 739 
incorporate the Bill of Rights and make it enforceable against the states, 
and there is considerable evidence that many of the framers thought the 
Privileges or Immunities of citizenship to encompass a “natural rights” 
theory of the fundamental rights of citizenship.129  The issue of 
incorporation has been hotly debated by a number of scholars.130  But the 
approach of this essay is to focus on what the framers understood the 
term “citizen” to mean and what rights they intended to be encompassed 
within that concept, because the framers explicitly linked the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause to the rights of citizenship.131  Evidence from the 
Ratification debates and contemporaneous legal doctrine indicates that 
the framers viewed the meaning of federal citizenship very broadly and 
that the rights that adhered to citizenship were considerably broader than 
those enumerated in the Bill of Rights.  Most importantly, the framers 
intended future Congresses to define citizenship rights expansively when 
exercising their enforcement power under Section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.132 
A.  The Ratification Debates 
With the Citizenship Clause, the framers overturned the Court’s 
ruling in Dred Scott, made freed slaves into citizens who belonged to the 
national political community and guaranteed to them the protection of 
the federal government.  When Bingham and the other framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment spoke of citizenship, what they wanted most 
was to create uniform federal rights that would not vary from state to 
state.  Prior to the Civil War, the basic rights of citizens of one state did 
 
 129. See Farber & Muensch, supra note 75; Fox, supra note 80. 
 130. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 18; 2 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1089-95 (1953); Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of 
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992) (arguing that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause does incorporate the Bill of Rights).  But see Charles Fairman, Does the 
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. 
REV. 5 (1949) (arguing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not incorporate the Bill of 
Rights because it has no clear meaning); Lino A. Graglia, Interpreting the Constitution: Posner on 
Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1033-34 (1992) (“[T]here is very little basis for the implausible 
proposition that the states that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment understood that it would 
‘incorporate’ the Bill of Rights, making its restrictions applicable to the states. . . .”); Raoul Berger, 
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: Akhil Amar’s Wishing Well, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1993) 
(arguing against Amar’s incorporation theory).  Prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court had 
ruled that the Bill of Rights was not intended to limit the states in the case of Barron v. Baltimore. 
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
 131. The Court in Saenz v. Roe, followed this approach.  526 U.S. 489 (1999).  Emphasizing 
the fundamental nature of the right to travel, the Court pointed out that “[t]he Citizenship Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment expressly equates citizenship with residence.”  Id. at 506. 
 132. See supra, notes 119-24 and accompanying text. 
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not extend beyond the borders of that state.133  The Citizenship Clause 
reflects the framers’ view of a more inclusive national political 
community, where it was only necessary to be born to become a 
member. 
Also, that national community had the responsibility to protect all 
of its members in exchange for their allegiance to that community.134  
This theory of citizenship reflected the “social compact” theory of John 
Locke, that people submit to the authority of the government in return 
for its protection.135  Consistent with this theory, an influential treatise at 
the time, the 1873 edition of Justice Story’s Commentaries on the 
Constitution defined a “citizen” as “a person owing allegiance to the 
government, and entitled to protection from it.”136  Thus, in protest of 
President Johnson’s veto of the first Civil Rights Act of 1866,137 
Representative Lyman Trumbull argued that citizens are entitled to 
protection within the United States, as well as abroad, stating, 
“allegiance and protection are reciprocal rights.”138 
Finally, the framers intended that the rights of federal citizens 
should be equal throughout the country.  The theme of equality of rights 
directly reflects the concerns of expressed by northern members of 
Congress in debates over the rights of citizenship prior to the Civil War.  
Prior to the Civil War, those members of Congress were outraged that 
citizens of one state could be denied their most basic rights by another 
state139 and they intended the Fourteenth Amendment to rectify this 
 
 133. For example, prior to the Civil War, South Carolina could imprison people of color who 
were citizens of other states solely because they entered South Carolina.  Id.  Oregon could exclude 
people of color and deny them the right to own property, enter into contracts or sue in state courts.  
See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 134. See Kaczorowski, supra note 75, at 878 (Republicans felt “a general obligation to secure 
the rights of Americans because they believed that in return for an allegiance to government, 
citizens were entitled to the protection of the government.”); Fox, supra note 49, at 504 (Congress 
enacted the Freedman’s Bureau legislation based on the theory that the federal government should 
reward the good citizenship of those who were loyal to the Union during the Civil War).  This 
theory of citizenship reflected the “social compact” theory of John Locke, who believed that people 
submit to the authority of the government in return for its protection. See Smith, supra note 13, at 
695.  Hence, the 1873 edition of Justice Story’s famous Commentaries on the Constitution defined a 
“citizen” as “a person owing allegiance to the government, and entitled to protection from it.”  2 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 654 (Thomas M. 
Cooley ed., Little, Brown, & Co., London 4th ed. 1873). 
 135. See Smith, supra note 13, at 695; Farber & Muench, supra note 75, at 241. 
 136. STORY, supra note 134, at 654. 
 137. 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 
 138. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866).  See also Farber & Muench, supra note 
72, at 275 (“[The framers] believed that the Fourteenth Amendment supplied the missing authority 
to protect basic human rights.”). 
 139. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text. 
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situation by creating a baseline of rights that would be uniform 
throughout the country.  Thus, that the rights of citizenship should be 
equal regardless of the state of one’s residence was expressed not only in 
the Equal Protection Clause, but also in the notion of citizenship itself.140 
The record is less clear with regard to which substantive rights the 
framers had in mind.141  However, a general paradigm emerges from the 
congressional debates at the time.  John Bingham and other antislavery 
constitutionalists believed that the privileges and immunities of 
citizenship, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, at least included 
the Bill of Rights.142  Thus, in March 1871, Bingham noted that the Bill 
of Rights “chiefly defined” the privileges and immunities of 
citizenship.143  Also, there is ample evidence that the framers at least 
intended to protect the trio of rights referred to in the Declaration of 
Independence, the right to life, liberty and property.  For example, in a 
debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1866,144 Representative William 
Lawrence of Ohio stated, [t]here are certain absolute rights which 
pertain to every citizen, which are inherent, and of which a state cannot 
constitutionally deprive him . . . the absolute right to live, the right of 
personal security, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy 
property.”145  Included in the meaning of “liberty” were the freedoms of 
speech and religion that southern states had denied too many citizens 
prior to the Civil War.146 
As expressed in the debates over the Negroes Seamen’s Acts147 and 
the admission of Oregon,148 the antislavery constitutionalists who later 
became the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment also believed that 
access to government facilities, such as courts149 and the right to enter 
 
 140. See Farber & Muench, supra note 75, at 251 (noting the framers were heavily influenced 
by vision of equality).  Senator Howard, when introducing Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
on the floor of Congress, declared that Section one “establishes equality before the law, and it gives 
to the humblest, the poorest, the most despised of the race the same rights as it gives the most 
powerful, the most wealthy, the most haughty.”  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866); 
Fox, supra note 49, at 520 n.357. 
 141. See Farber & Muench, supra note 75, at 277 (stating that the difficult part about 
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment is determining which fundamental rights the framers 
intended to protect). 
 142. See Aynes, supra note 14, at 71. 
 143. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., App. 84 (1871). 
 144. 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 
 145. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866). 
 146. See Farber & Muench, supra note 75, at 277; CURTIS, supra note 17, at 76. 
 147. See supra, notes 29-41 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra, notes 53-62 and accompanying text. 
 149. See also Smith, supra note 13, at 802 (framers of Fourteenth Amendment wished to 
establish the right to sue in federal courts, pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, as a right of 
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into legal contracts, as well as the right to travel, were privileges and 
immunities of citizenship.  However, a majority of the framers did not 
see the right to vote as a right of citizenship.150  They differentiated 
“civil rights,” centering on the right to participate in the legal system in 
such basic means as entering into contracts and owning real property, 
from “political” rights like the right to vote.  Only the former “civil” 
rights were considered to adhere to federal citizenship. 
There is also considerable evidence that some framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment intended the rights of citizenship to be 
considerably broader, encompassing all fundamental human rights and 
linking those rights to national citizenship.151 Prior to the Civil War, 
John Bingham had argued that the rights of citizens included “the 
equality of all to the right to live; to the right to know; to argue and to 
utter, according to conscience; to work and enjoy the product of their 
toil . . . the rock on which that Constitution rests.”152  Others went even 
further, propounding a “natural law” view of citizenship rights that 
encompassed all fundamental rights.  For example, when Senator 
Howard introduced Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Senate, he indicated that in order to find the privileges or immunities of 
federal citizenship, one should look to the Bill of Rights and to the 
Circuit Court’s opinion in Corfield v. Coryell,153 a lower court case that 
was well known for embodying a broad, natural rights theory of 
citizenship.154  Similarly, Senator Lyman Trumbull declared in a debate 
over the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment: “To be a citizen of 
the United States carries with it some rights, and what are they?  They 
are those inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free citizens as 
 
citizenship). 
 150. SMITH, supra note 19, at 306; Curtis, supra note 18.  Enacted in 1870, the Fifteenth 
Amendment extended the right to vote to freed slaves and prohibited states from denying the 
franchise “on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”  U.S. CONST. amend XV, 
§1.  Significantly, that Amendment also included a congressional enforcement provision.  U.S. 
CONST. amend XV, §2. 
 151. See Fox, supra note 49, at 503-04 (“For Republicans, fundamental human rights and 
American citizenship were closely linked, since America was founded on fundamental human 
rights.”); Smith, supra note 13, at 730; Farber & Muench, supra note 75, at 236 (discussing the 
influence of natural law theory on the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 152. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859). 
 153. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). 
 154. In Corfield, the court articulated a comprehensive list of the fundamental rights of 
“citizens of all free governments,” including “[p]rotection by the government; the enjoyment of life 
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain 
happiness and safety. . . .  The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other 
state . . . to claim the benefit of writ of habeas corpus . . . [and] to institute and maintain actions of 
any kind in the courts of the state.”  Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52. 
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free men in all countries.”155 
That many of the framers believed in natural rights does not mean 
that they intended the rights of federal citizenship to be unlimited.  As 
even Senator Trumbull’s remarks make clear, those rights must be 
linked with citizenship in some way in order to be enforceable through 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  For example, a congressional provision 
defining the standards for divorce procedures would clearly not fit 
within the citizenship framework, nor would a federal law criminalizing 
pick-pocketing.  Nevertheless, congressional debates during the 
Reconstruction Era, as well as legislation that Congress enacted during 
that period, reveal that Congress intended the Citizenship Clause and 
rights of federal citizenship to be a broad font of nationally uniform 
individual rights.  Congressional debates also reveal that the framers 
intended Congress to play an active role in defining those rights through 
legislation. 
B.  Reconstruction Era Legislation 
The most concrete expression of the framer’s understanding of the 
rights of citizenship can be found in the civil rights legislation that they 
enacted contemporaneously to the Fourteenth Amendment.  Those 
statutes are replete with the language of citizenship and the rights that 
adhere thereto.  For example, in the 1866 Civil Rights Act, Congress 
declared that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same 
right, in every State or Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof 
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal 
property.”156  The Act also guaranteed “all persons” in the United States 
“the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . and to the full and 
equal benefit of the laws . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”157  The Ku 
Klux Klan Act of 1871 prohibited conspiracies by state or private actors 
to prevent a person from “exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of 
the United States. . . .”158  Finally, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which 
prohibited race discrimination in privately owned places of public 
accommodation, was titled “[A]n act to protect all citizens in their civil 
 
 155. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866). 
 156. 14 Stat. 27 (1866), now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982.  The original version considered by 
Congress also provided that all persons born in the United States would be citizens of the United 
States.  That portion of the Bill was omitted after the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment made it unnecessary. 
 157. 16 Stat. 144 (1870) now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 
 158. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 2(3), 17 Stat 13 (1871), codified in Rev. Stat. of 
1874, § 1980, now 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 
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and legal rights.”159  That portions of both the 1871 and the 1875 Acts 
applied to private conduct indicates that immediately following the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, members of Congress 
believed that their power to protect the rights of citizenship was not 
limited to state action.160 
The civil rights legislation of the Reconstruction Era reflected the 
themes of belonging, protection and equality that resound throughout the 
framer’s discussion of the rights of citizenship.  The 1866 Civil Rights 
Act161 enabled all citizens to participate in basic legal processes, such as 
entering into contracts and using the court system, that would facilitate 
their belonging to their community.  During the Reconstruction Era, 
members of Congress repeatedly referred to the right to own property 
and enter into contract as a basic right of citizenship because citizens 
were entitled to participate in the legal structure.162  That some states had 
denied free persons of color access to their legal systems had prevented 
them from belonging to the legal polity. 
Protection was the theme of the 1871 Enforcement Act,163 which 
made it a crime to interfere with a citizen’s exercise of his rights of 
citizenship.  Throughout Congressional debates over the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the framers repeated their desire to protect the freed slaves, 
and other federal citizens, from infringement of their rights.164  For 
example, the 1871 Act165 responded to massive organized race based 
violence in the southern states, and thus is commonly known as the Klu 
Klux Klan Act.166  Members of Congress were concerned that states 
 
 159. 18 Stat. 335.  The Supreme Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in Civil Rights 
Cases, stating that it was beyond Congress’  Thirteenth Amendment enforcement powers because it 
was not directly related to slavery, and that it was beyond Congress’  Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement power because it applied to private, not state action.  109 U.S. 3 (1883).  In one of the 
strongest articulations of the rights of citizenship by any member of the Court in that era, Justice 
Harlan vociferously dissented.  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  In 
retrospect, as with his dissent to Plessy v. Fergusson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (arguing that “separate 
but equal” Jim Crow laws violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), 
Justice Harlan’s interpretation of the 14th Amendment in the Civil Rights Cases was undoubtedly 
the correct one.  See infra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.  Nevertheless, the Court recently 
relied on the majority opinion of the Civil Rights Cases to support its holding in Morrison that 
Congress’s authorization of suits against private individuals in the Violence Against Women Act 
fell beyond its Section five enforcement power.  529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 160. Fox, supra note 80, at 135-36 (pointing out that the 1871 Act applies to private conduct). 
 161. 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 
 162. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859). 
 163. 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
 164. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859). 
 165. 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
 166. See Fox, supra note 80, at 126. 
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were not actively prosecuting the instigators of this violence, so they 
created federal causes of action, hoping to use the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts to protect their citizens from that violence when the states 
would not. 167  The Klu Klux Klan Act made it a federal crime for private 
individuals or state actors to conspire to deprive citizens of their right to 
vote, serve on juries, and obtain equal protection of the law.168  Members 
of Congress clearly believed that the Fourteenth Amendment gave them 
the power to protect their citizens in this fashion.  For example, the 
principle proponent of the Act, Representative Shellabarger emphasized 
the establishment of national citizenship in the Citizenship Clause and 
argued that “to legislate directly for enforcement of such rights are 
fundamental elements of citizenship.”169  Other members of Congress 
shared Shellabarger’s view of the scope of congressional power to 
protect the rights of citizenship.170 
Finally, the theme of equality of rights, expressed by the framers as 
they introduced the Fourteenth Amendment,171 is reflected throughout 
the Reconstruction Era civil rights acts, which were intended to ensure 
that United States citizens had equal rights regardless of where they 
lived or traveled.  The Civil Rights Act of 1875172 took that theme one 
step further, attempting to equalize the rights of citizens in their private 
transactions.  The 1875 Act indicates a very broad view of citizenship 
rights, prohibiting race discrimination even in the “social” realm.173  
Moreover, the 1875 Act provided that the freedom from race 
discrimination was such a fundamental right of citizenship that its 
denial, even by private parties, would be a federal offense. 174 
 
 167. See CURTIS, supra note 18, at 158 (“The denial of equal protection by local officials was a 
major problem that concerned the Republicans,” and the reason why Congress decided to provide 
direct federal protection). 
 168. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
 169. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. App. 69 (1871). 
 170. See Fox, supra note 80, at 127, citing CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 334 (1871) 
(statement of Representative Hoar) (“Congress is empowered by the fourteenth amendment to pass 
all ‘appropriate legislation’ to secure the privileges and immunities of the citizen.”). 
 171. See supra, note 82. 
 172. 18 Stat. 335 (1875). 
 173. See UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 113, at 481 (noting the Civil Rights Act of 1875 
was “aimed to protect the freedmen from deprivation of the minimal rights of citizenship.”). 
 174. See Fox, supra note 80, at 137 (arguing that supporters of the 1875 Act saw it as 
implementing the privileges and immunities of federal citizenship).  That Act created civil and 
criminal liability for violations.  The Court struck down that Act in the Civil Rights Cases, reading a 
state action requirement into Congress’ Section five enforcement powers.  109 U.S. 3 (1883).  See 
infra notes 200-03 and accompanying text. 
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III.  THE FADING VISION AND THE ROLE OF THE COURT 
Unfortunately, that broad vision of citizenship rights and 
congressional power has been lost over time, and since Reconstruction 
Congress has not expressly relied on its power to define the rights of 
citizenship.  What happened to the vision of the framers?  Much of the 
decline of this vision is attributable to the post-Reconstruction 
retrenchment of the political branches of federal government,175 
especially after the compromise of 1876 when President Rutherford B. 
Hayes agreed to pull northern troops out of the south, putting an end to 
Reconstruction, in exchange for his election to President.176  The 
Supreme Court also played a major role in squelching congressional 
enthusiasm in two important rulings, The Slaughter-House Cases177 and 
The Civil Rights Cases.178 In The Slaughter-House Cases the Court 
rejected Senator Howard’s broad, natural rights view of the rights of 
federal citizenship, reading the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment more narrowly than intended by the Framers.179  
In The Civil Rights Cases, the Court held that Congress’ power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to remedying state 
action.180  These rulings help to explain why Congress has abandoned its 
earlier vision of federal citizenship as a font of congressionally 
enforceable rights.  However, closer scrutiny of these cases reveals that 
neither ruling prevents Congress from resurrecting its vision now. 
A.  The Slaughter-House Cases 
In The Slaughter-House Cases the Court rejected the broadest, 
 
 175. See Farber & Muench, supra note 75, at 260-61 (describing President Andrew Johnson’s 
measures to undermine Reconstruction); SMITH, supra note 19, at 302. 
 176. See FONER, supra note 51, at 577 (chapter 12). 
 177. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
 178. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  The Court’s ruling in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) 
that the right of peaceable assembly and the right to bear arms were not privileges secured by the 
14th Amendment and in Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876), that the Seventh Amendment right 
to trial by jury was not a privilege or immunity of citizenship, also caused Congress to adopt a much 
more restrictive view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause by 1876.  CURTIS, supra note 18, at 
170. 
 179. See Aynes, supra note 84, at 627 (“‘[E]veryone’ agrees [that] the Court [in Slaughter-
House] incorrectly interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause. . . .”).  But see Bryan H. 
Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court and Congress on 
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1063 
(2000) (arguing that Justice Miller’s majority opinion in Slaughter-House was a compromise ruling 
that left open the possibility of incorporation of the Bill of Rights and was consistent with the intent 
of the framers). 
 180. 109 U.S. at 15. 
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natural rights theory of the privileges and immunities of citizenship held 
by some framers of the Fourteenth Amendment when it held that those 
rights did not include the right to pursue an occupation, but maintain the 
view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects the rights of 
federal citizenship.181  The Court held that states, not the federal 
government, have the responsibility of defining and protecting the 
fundamental rights of citizens.182  Slaughter-House was not an 
interpretation of congressional enforcement power under Section five of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, but of the self-enforcing provisions of 
Section one.  Thus, on its face it does not limit congressional power to 
enforce the privileges and immunities of citizenship.  However, the fact 
that the Court expressed a more restrictive view of the rights of 
citizenship than was held by many of the framers may very well have 
placed a damper on congressional enforcement of those rights following 
the Slaughter-House ruling. 
Professor James Fox has recently argued that Slaughter-House had 
a significant impact on congressional debates about civil rights 
legislation immediately following the Court’s ruling.183  Fox points out 
that the first version of the 1875 Civil Rights Act,184 which prohibited 
race discrimination in privately owned places of public accommodation, 
was introduced in 1870, and was heavily debated in Congress 
throughout the period.  After the Court’s opinion in Slaughter-House, 
opponents of the Bill argued that it now fell outside Congress’ power to 
protect the privileges or immunities of citizenship, because of Justice 
Miller’s narrow interpretation of those rights in Slaughter-House.185  In 
response, supporters argued that freedom from discrimination remained 
a right of federal citizenship, emphasizing the equality based nature of 
citizenship rights.186  However, Fox is doubtless correct when he points 
out that Slaughter-House played an important role in “effect(ing) the 
 
 181. See Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of 
the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 659 (2000).  The link between the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause and the rights of federal citizenship is apparent from the fact that the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause directly follows the Citizenship Clause and refers to the “Privileges or 
Immunities of citizens of the United States.”  Id.  Moreover, the framers relied on their 
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV in their theory of federal 
citizenship which is embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.  See supra notes 60-62 and 
accompanying text. 
 182. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 76 (1873). 
 183. See Fox, supra note 80, at 148-55. 
 184. 18 Stat. 335 (1875). 
 185. Id. at 148. 
 186. See CONG. GLOBE, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess. 3452-54 (1874) (statement of Senator 
Frelinghuysen), cited in Fox, supra note 80, at 149. 
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subtle elimination of fundamental privileges of national citizenship from 
the congressional and national political discourse over the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Reconstruction.”187 
Fox points out that Slaughter-House caused members of Congress 
to steer away from the broad, natural rights view of the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship, and to pay more attention to the Equal 
Protection Clause as a source of equal rights.188  However, as this article 
has pointed out, equality of rights was a driving theme behind the 
framers’ vision of national citizenship rights.189  Thus, the language and 
vision of citizenship rights survived in the final version of the 1875 
Act.190  This is consistent with the argument that the Court’s ruling in 
Slaughter-House may be a less restrictive reading of federal citizenship 
than is generally recognized.191  On further reflection, Justice Miller’s 
majority opinion appears to be a compromise between eviscerating the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause and adopting the plaintiff’s broad 
natural law theory.  The Court held instead that the Clause does not 
protect all rights, only uniquely federal rights.192  Bryan Wildenthal has 
argued that Slaughter-House merely rejected the natural rights theory of 
the plaintiffs but did not necessarily reject the view that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights against the 
states.193  Even without addressing the issue of Miller’s views on 
incorporation, however, it is apparent that Miller’s opinion does not 
necessarily place significant limits on the rights of federal citizenship. 
In Slaughter-House, Justice Miller distinguished between the rights 
 
 187. Fox, supra note 80, at 155.  Moreover, after Slaughter-House, the Court issued a series of 
opinions narrowing its views of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, culminating in a list of federal 
citizenship rights in the case of Twining v. New Jersey. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).  Many commentators 
consider this list paltry and redundant, and may have further dampened congressional interest in 
developing the privileges and immunities of citizenship.  For an excellent discussion of the 
development of the Court’s interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause from Slaughter-
House to Twining, see Bryan Wildenthal, The Road to Twining: Reassessing the Disincorporation 
of the Bill of Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457 (2000). 
 188. Fox, supra note 80, at 149-50 (“Even among the more forceful defenders of the Bill, 
therefore, Slaughter-House effected a rhetorical shift away from a fundamental or natural rights 
position and toward a mere equality approach to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.”). 
 189. Supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text. 
 190. 18 Stat. 335 (1875). 
 191. Aynes, supra note 84, at 661.  See Newsom, supra note 181, at 659 (arguing that if the 
Court had ruled on their behalf, the ruling could have been interpreted as “a wholesale transfer of 
authority over individual rights—including traditional, common-law rights of contract and 
property—from the states to the federal government.”); Wildenthal, supra note 179 (arguing that 
Justice Miller’s opinion in Slaughter-House did not reject the view that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause incorporated the Bill of Rights against the states). 
 192. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. 36. 
 193. See Wildenthal, supra note 179. 
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of state and federal citizenship, holding that “fundamental rights,” such 
as the right to enter into a profession of one’s choice, argued by the 
plaintiffs in that case, were rights of state citizenship rather than federal 
citizenship.  Upon reflection, Miller’s opinion seems to have merely 
rejected the broadest, natural rights view of federal citizenship, while 
maintaining a fairly broad view of the rights of federal citizenship.  The 
federal rights that Justice Miller identified as protected by the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in his Slaughter-
House opinion are those that have direct links to federal citizenship.  
They include rights “which owe their existence to the Federal 
government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.”194  In 
dicta, Miller supplied a non-exhaustive list of some rights of federal 
citizenship, including the right “to come to the seat of government to 
assert any claim he may have upon that government, to transact any 
business he may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, 
and to engage in administering its functions, and [t]he right to peaceably 
assemble and petition for redress of grievances.” 195 
The Slaughter-House list emphasizes the themes of belonging and 
protection that had influenced the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as well as the importance of citizens’ participation in their 
government.  Thus, while the Court in Slaughter-House rejected a 
wholesale fundamental rights theory of federal civil rights, it did not 
purport to restrict the rights of federal citizenship.  Consistent with this 
reading of Slaughter-House, the Court has since found the right to vote 
in federal elections,196 the right to appear in federal court,197 the right to 
petition the federal government,198 and the right to travel199 to be federal 
citizenship rights. 
 
 194. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 79. 
 195. Id. at 79-80 (citing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 36 (1867)). 
 196. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 328-29 (1941). 
 197. See Terral v. Burke Const. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 531-32 (1922). 
 198. See, e.g, Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 513 (1939) (noting the right to 
assemble to discuss national legislation and the rights and benefits to accrue citizens therefrom); 
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (recognizing the right to petition Congress). 
 199. Most recently, the Court found the right to travel to be a citizenship right protected by the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503 (1997).  The Court had 
previously found the right to travel to be a protected citizenship right in numerous cases, without 
identifying the constitutional source of that right.  See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 
(1966); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (striking down a California statute that 
criminalized the entrance of a pauper into the state as violating the right to travel). 
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B.  The Civil Rights Cases 
In The Civil Rights Cases, the Court directly limited congressional 
enforcement power when it struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 
which prohibited “any person” from denying to “any citizen” access to 
privately owned places of public accommodation on the basis of race.200  
In that case, the Court held that Congress’ power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment is limited to remedying state action.201  The 
Court articulated a cramped view of congressional power, stating in 
dicta that the legislation which Congress is authorized to adopt under the 
Fourteenth Amendment “is not general legislation upon the rights of the 
citizen, but corrective legislation such as may be necessary and proper 
for counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or enforce.”202  The 
state action limitation has proven to be a major barrier to congressional 
enforcement of Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.203 
However, the opinion in the Civil Rights Cases that better reflects 
the intent of the framers is not the majority ruling, but Justice Harlan’s 
dissent.204  In Prigg v. Pennsylvania,205 the Court had recognized 
congressional power to require private parties to return fugitive slaves 
even though Article IV referred only to state action.206  In his dissent to 
the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Harlan relied on the Prigg ruling to argue 
that state action is not required for Congress to enforce the civil rights 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.207  Harlan pointed out that by 
 
 200. 18 Stat. 335 (1875). 
 201. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).  The Court also found that the Act fell beyond 
Congress’ power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment because the Thirteenth Amendment “relates 
only to slavery and involuntary servitude.”  Id. at 20.  However, the Court overruled that aspect of 
the Civil Rights Cases in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).  This question was 
over the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. §1982 which was originally part of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, and prohibited discrimination on the basis of race in real property transactions.  In Jones, the 
Court found that the bill was a constitutional attempt on the part of Congress to remedy “badges and 
incidents” of slavery.  Id. 
 202. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13-14.  The Court later cited this language to support its 
holding in City of Boerne v. Flores, that Congress cannot create new substantive constitutional 
rights, but is limited to remedying constitutional violations.  521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 203. See Fox, supra note 80, at 162.  For example, in United States v. Morrison, the Court cited 
the Civil Rights Cases to support the proposition that civil rights provision of the Violence Against 
Women Act, which created a federal cause of action against private individuals who engaged in 
gender motivated violence, did not fall within Congress’ Section five power to enforce the equal 
protection clause.  529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 204. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 205. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
 206. Amar, supra note 22, at 70. 
 207. Id. at 53. 
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ruling otherwise, the majority created an anomaly.208  Namely, the Court 
enabled the Congress to legislate to vindicate slavery, but not to secure 
the rights of freed slaves.209  In fact, members of Congress had cited 
Prigg during the debates over the Ku Klux Klan Act in support of their 
power to legislate with regard to private action.210  Congressional power 
to enforce civil rights is even clearer than the power it had enjoyed to 
derive the rights of fugitive slaves, since Section five is an explicit 
congressional empowerment that Article IV lacked.211  Based on this 
reasoning, the Citizenship Clause itself may provide an affirmative grant 
to Congress to protect the rights of federal citizens against infringement 
by private parties.  It is possible that the Court would have to overrule 
the Civil Rights Cases before Congress could exercise this power against 
private parties.212  Nonetheless, the Civil Rights Cases ruling does not 
prevent Congress from broadly protect the rights of citizenship against 
state infringement. 
C.  Retrenchment 
Finally, the federal civil rights statutes from the Reconstruction Era 
failed to deliver their promise of belonging, protection and equality.  The 
statutes were largely not enforced.213  By the turn of the century, the 
Supreme Court found that state sponsored segregation did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the case of 
Plessy v. Ferguson, gutting that provision’s power to bring about racial 
justice.214  Jim Crow was in full swing, as was rampant racial violence 
against blacks throughout the south.  By the turn of the 20th century, 
equal citizenship was no longer a realistic alternative for African 
Americans.  Instead, they were reduced to seeking bare physical 
protection against lynching,215 and even that protection was seldom 
 
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. (“The national legislature may, without transcending the limits of the constitution, 
do for human liberty and the fundamental rights of American citizenship, what it did, with the 
sanction of this Court, for the protection of slavery and the rights of masters of freed slaves.”). 
 210. CURTIS, supra note 18, at 159. 
 211. See Amar, supra note 22, at 71. 
 212. But see infra, notes 274-302 and accompanying text (arguing that the State Action 
Requirement might not limit congressional enforcement of the Citizenship Clause). 
 213. See Chambers, supra note 96, at 1600: (“The national government’s retreat from civil 
rights enforcement following Reconstruction and relinquishment of responsibility to state and local 
officials led to lawlessness, lynching, and the entrenchment of segregation.”). 
 214. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 215. William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 50 (1999). 
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received.216 
IV.  A LOST OPPORTUNITY TO ENFORCE THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP 
During the Reconstruction Era, Congress was motivated by John 
Bingham’s vision of national citizenship and enacted a flurry of 
legislation to define and protect the rights that adhered thereto.  By the 
end of the 19th Century, however, Congress appears to have lost that 
vision.  During the Civil Rights Era of the 1960s, Congress again 
enacted wide-reaching legislation to protect the rights of its citizens, but 
did not return to its Reconstruction Era vision of national citizenship 
rights.217  Proponents of the 1960s legislation relied on not the 
Citizenship Clause, but the Equal Protection Clause and the Commerce 
Clause for authorization of its legislation.218  Thus, the era was a lost 
opportunity for Congress to expansively define the rights of federal 
citizenship in accordance with Bingham’s theory of citizenship. 
A.  1960s Era Civil Rights Legislation 
In 1954, the Supreme Court reactivated the Equal Protection Clause 
by its ruling in Brown v. Board of Education219 that segregated 
elementary schools violated equal protection.  This ruling effectively 
overturned Plessy v. Fergusson220 and revived the almost moribund 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Brown led to a 
series of Supreme Court decisions striking down state sponsored 
segregation,221 and eventually dismantling the Jim Crow system in the 
south.  Simultaneously, the civil rights movement of Dr. Martin Luther 
King and his followers ignited political opposition to race based 
segregation.  In response, Congress enacted a new flurry of civil rights 
 
 216. Chambers, supra note 96, at 1600. 
 217. Although it is not a congressional document, the 1947 Report of the President’s 
Committee on Civil Rights in an indication of the prevalent view within the federal government 
about what rights were linked to citizenship.  That document’s discussion of citizenship rights is 
limited to the right to vote, and principally, the denial of the right to vote to African Americans by 
southern states.  See TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS 32-40 (1947). 
 218. See Pope, supra note 6, at 5 (“The great social movements that sought to expand 
congressional powers during the twentieth century framed their claims in the language of human 
rights, not commerce.”). 
 219. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 220. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 221. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches); Gayle v. 
Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses); New 
Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks). 
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legislation, beginning with the 1964 Civil Rights Act222 and the 1965 
Voting Rights Act.223  Title II of the 1964 Act, like its Reconstruction 
Era predecessor almost 100 years before, prohibited race discrimination 
in places of public accommodation, and prohibited discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, sex or religion in employment.224  In 1875, Congress 
had viewed the freedom from private discrimination as a right of 
citizenship.  Congress’ focus had changed by the early 1960s, and as 
members of Congress sought a source of power to enact laws preventing 
private discrimination, they focused instead on the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Commerce Clause.  Proponents of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 relied primarily not on the broad promise of freedom and equality 
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment, but on congressional power to 
regulate interstate commerce. 225 
At the time that Congress was considering the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, there was considerable debate about whether Congress should rely 
on Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause 
powers.226  The Kennedy/Johnson administration argued from the start 
that the bill should rest on Commerce Clause powers because that 
authority was clearly constitutional.227  But some members of Congress 
countered that because the bill was about discrimination and civil rights, 
the authority clearly came from the Equal Protection Clause.228  Other 
members were concerned about using the Commerce Clause to intrude 
on matters that had historically been under local control.229  The reason 
 
 222. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964). 
 223. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965). 
 224. While Title VII originally only applied to private employers, Congress expanded its 
coverage in 1972 to state employees. 
 225. BUREAU OF NATIONAL BUSINESS AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: TEXT, 
ANALYSIS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: WHAT IT MEANS TO EMPLOYERS, BUSINESSMEN, UNIONS, 
EMPLOYEES, MINORITY GROUPS 81-82, 324 (1964). 
 226. See A Bill to Eliminate Discrimination in Public Accommodations Affecting Interstate 
Commerce, 1963: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong. (1963); 
Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 448 (discussing the congressional debate over the source of its power 
to address private discrimination). 
 227. For example, in his testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee’s hearings in 
1963, Attorney General Robert Kennedy stated that the law would be “clearly constitutional” under 
the commerce clause, and that the Fourteenth Amendment did not clearly give Congress the 
authority to enact the statute.  A Bill to Eliminate Discrimination in Public Accommodations 
Affecting Interstate Commerce, 1963: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 
88th Cong. 28 (1963). 
 228. Note, for example, the comments of Senator Pastore, “[I] believe in this bill, because I 
believe in the dignity of man, not because it impedes out [commerce].  [I] like to feel that what we 
are talking about is a moral issue.  [A]nd that morality, it seems to me, comes under the Fourteenth 
Amendment [about] equal protection of the law.”  Id. at 252. 
 229. For example, Senator Mulroney, a Democratic Senator sympathetic with the policy of the 
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why members of Congress relied on the Commerce Clause instead of the 
Equal Protection Clause as the primary source of power to enact the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was because Title II of that Act prohibited 
discrimination by privately owned places of public accommodation.  The 
Court’s ruling in the Civil Rights Cases appeared to limit congressional 
power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause to state action.230  
Members of Congress eventually decided to rely on both sources, but do 
not appear to have considered the citizenship power as a source for this 
legislation. 
In support of its use of the commerce power, Congress relied on 
reports that individual instances of segregation cost thousands to 
millions of dollars because people were deterred by discrimination from 
engaging in interstate commerce.231  However, the central focus of the 
debate over the bill, which included an 82-day filibuster in the Senate, 
“inhered in disputes about the norms and commitments that inhabit the 
Equal Protection Clause.”232  Ultimately, the Court upheld Congress’ 
power to enact the bill under the Commerce Clause and did not reach the 
question of whether congressional enforcement of the Equal Protection 
Clause could address private discrimination.233  Following rulings by the 
 
law, noted that he was “worried about the use” of the Commerce Clause “on matters which have 
been for more than 170 years thought to be within the realm of local control. . . . [If] we pass this 
bill, even though the end we seek is good, I wonder how far we are stretching the Constitution.”  Id. 
at 66. 
 230. See Estreicher, supra note 108, at 451. 
 231. See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, Hearing on S. 1732 before the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., App. V, pp. 1383-87 (1963). 
 232. Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 494. 
 233. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (finding the application 
of Title II to a hotel in downtown Atlanta to be within Congress’ Commerce Clause powers); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (finding the application of the bill to a large barbecue 
restaurant located eleven blocks from an interstate highway to be within the Commerce Clause 
powers).  The Court found that the aggregate effect of discrimination on interstate commerce was 
sufficient to satisfy its test under Wickard v. Filburn.  317 U.S. 111 (1942).  On the issue of whether 
the commerce power was a proper source of power for anti-discrimination law, the Court stated, 
“[t]hat Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in many of these areas rendered its 
enactments no less valid. . . .  [T]hat fact does not detract from the overwhelming evidence of the 
disruptive effect that racial discrimination has had on commercial intercourse.”  Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, 379 U.S. at 257.  Congress’ reliance on the commerce clause made it unnecessary for the 
Court to re-visit its ruling in the Civil Rights Cases, which appeared to require state action for 
congressional enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause.  See Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 495-
96.  Siegel and Post point out the Court’s broad reading of Congress’ power to address private 
discrimination under the Thirteenth Amendment in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 
(1968), and that six Justices in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), suggested that Congress 
could use its § 5 powers to address private discrimination.  See generally, id.  They argue, “[b]y the 
end of the decade, Congress, the Court and the American people all expected the federal 
government to lead the fight against discrimination in the public and private sectors.”  Id. at 501.  
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Court, Congress accepted the Court’s invitation and based much of its 
subsequent civil rights legislation, including the Americans with 
Disabilities Act at issue in Garrett,234 the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act at issue in Kimel,235 and the civil rights provision of the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1995 at issue in Morrison,236 on its 
power under the Commerce Clause and Section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.237 
B.  The Lost Opportunity for Bingham’s Theory of Citizenship 
The 1960s were a lost opportunity for a revival of Bingham’s 
theory of citizenship.  During the 20th Century, members of Congress 
did not appear to have considered the Citizenship Clause, the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause, or the rights of federal citizenship as a source of 
power to enact legislation in that era.  Yet there is a strong argument that 
they could have done so consistently with the intent of the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  As discussed above, there is apt authority to 
support the view that “the framers intended to grant Congress authority 
to protect the fundamental rights of all American citizens, regardless of 
the source of the infringement.”238  Moreover, during that time, the 
Court was receptive to congressional power, adopting an elastic 
approach to legislative action that was conducive to congressional 
experimentation while broadening its power to legislate the rights of its 
citizens.239  If Congress had based this legislation on its power to enforce 
the rights of citizenship, it could have obviated the need for the 
expansion of the commerce power and instead modeled a source of 
 
The Guest opinion explicitly reserved the question of whether Congress’ power to enforce the Equal 
Protection Clause could reach private discrimination, but found that Congress could address private 
conduct when enforcing the rights of federal citizenship.  See infra notes 284-91 and accompanying 
text.  In retrospect that may have been an unfortunate result, as the Court sent many signals during 
that time that it did not believe that state action was required, and that it might have been willing to 
bow to the strong political will behind the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and overturn the Civil Rights 
Cases.  Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 494. 
 234. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 235. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 236. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 237. Congress has also often used its spending power to enact anti-discrimination legislation.  
See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism’s Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver of Sovereign 
Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 172 n. 208 (2002).  Given the Court’s recent cutbacks on 
Congress’ other powers, the spending power is increasingly important as a source of civil rights 
legislation.  Id. 
 238. Kaczorowski, supra note 75, at 869.  See supra Part III.A. 
 239. See Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 517 (arguing that the Court saw Congress as a partner 
in making its vision of the Fourteenth Amendment “more firmly law” during the 1960s). 
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rights that provided broad power to enforce the rights of its citizens 
without unduly threatening the sovereignty of the states. 
While John Bingham and the other framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not provide an exhaustive list of citizenship rights, it is 
clear that they intended to create a national community, the members of 
which were to be protected by laws on an equal basis.  Who the national 
community includes, as well as the meaning of citizenship itself, have 
expanded considerably since the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  For example, while the framers did not consider the right 
to vote to be a citizenship right,240 it is now axiomatic that the right to 
vote is a right of citizenship.  Moreover, while the framers did not 
consider women to be equal citizens, they are now considered to be such 
as a result of the Nineteenth Amendment, which gave women the right 
to vote and reflects an expansive vision of the civil rights of women.241  
The specific rights of citizenship today therefore cannot and should not 
be limited to what the framers intended them to be.  Nor is it possible to 
determine what those specific rights would have been.242  However, 
what is possible to discern is that Bingham and the others intended 
Congress to have broad power to define the rights of citizenship over 
time and to enact legislation to protect those rights. 
The argument that Congress could have relied on its power to 
enforce the rights of citizenship is the strongest with regard to Title II of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.243  Like that Act, the Civil Rights Act of 
1875 prohibited discrimination in places of private accommodation.  
That the Reconstruction Era Congress understood the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875 to define and protect the values of citizenship is clear from the 
title of the act, “An act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal 
rights,”244 and from repeated references to the rights of federal 
citizenship made by supporters of the bill throughout the debate over the 
Act.245  Because the provisions of the 1875 and 1964 Acts are so similar, 
it takes a small step to consider the protections provided by the 1964 Act 
as falling within congressional power to enforce the rights of citizenship, 
as intended by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Envisioning other anti-discrimination legislation, such as the Age 
 
 240. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 241. See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 960 (2002). 
 242. See supra notes 141-55 and accompanying text. 
 243. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964). 
 244. 18 Stat. 335 (1875).  See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text. 
 245. Id. 
40
Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 4, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss4/5
NEWZEITLOW.DOC 7/28/03  11:50 AM 
2003] CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS 757 
Discrimination in Employment Act at issue in Kimel,246 and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act at issue in Garrett,247 as legislation to 
protect citizenship rights requires more of a stretch.  However, this 
legislation arguably enables citizens to participate more broadly in the 
national community, and therefore may fall under the rubric of 
protection of citizenship rights.  When a person suffers discrimination on 
the basis of a characteristic that is unrelated to his or her qualifications, 
the discrimination limits that person’s ability to participate as an active 
and productive member of his or her community and limits his or her 
ability to belong to that community.  The link to belonging is 
particularly clear with regard to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
which requires states and private employers to make their facilities 
accessible to the disabled, enabling them to participate regardless of 
their disability. 
Finally, the civil rights provision at issue in Morrison,248 which 
created a federal cause of action for victims of gender-motivated 
violence, also falls within Congress’ power to protect the rights of its 
citizens. Like the Klu Klux Klan Act of 1871,249 it is a congressional 
attempt to protect the rights of its citizens that states had repeatedly 
failed to protect,250 by providing access to federal courts for the 
vindication of what Congress had defined as a civil right, the right to be 
free from gender motivated violence.251  Thus, it is possible that all of 
the statutes at issue in the Court’s recent decisions restricting 
congressional power to enforce civil rights might have been based on 
Congress’ power to define and protect the rights of its citizens. 
V.  OVERCOMING BARRIERS WITH THE CITIZENSHIP POWER 
Given that the Court upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964,252 why 
does it matter that Congress did not base that legislation in its Fourteenth 
Amendment citizenship power?  It matters because, had Congress relied 
on its power to enforce the Citizenship Clause, it could have established 
 
 246. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 247. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 248. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 249. 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
 250. See Brief of Amici Curiae States of Ariz. et al., U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, *5-*6 
(2000) (Nos. 99-5) available at LEXSEE 1999 U.S. BRIEFS 5. (arguing that numerous studies of 
the treatment of women in state courts show that states are failing to protect women from gender 
motivated violence). 
 251. For a more in-depth argument that the civil rights provision of Violence Against Women 
Act falls within Congress’ Citizenship Power, see Zietlow, supra note 7, at 328-30. 
 252. See supra note 233. 
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a firm base for other civil rights legislation that it wanted to enact during 
periods, like now, when the Court is less deferential to congressional 
power.253  Although most people agree that defining and enforcing civil 
rights is an important aspect of congressional power,254 the Court’s 
recent rulings restricting the commerce power, and the power to enforce 
Equal Protection under Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, have 
greatly weakened Congress’ power to enact civil rights legislation.  If 
Congress were to return to Bingham’s theory of citizenship, 
congressional power to define and enforce the rights of citizenship might 
provide a solution to both problems. 
A.  The Barriers 
The recent rulings of the Court have created two barriers to 
Congress enacting civil rights legislation, limiting congressional power 
to protect its citizens against both private and state discrimination.  First, 
the Court’s ruling in United States v. Morrison255 greatly limits 
Congress’ power to regulate discriminatory private activity.256  In 
Morrison, the Court disregarded congressional data that violence against 
women caused economic harm and held that gender motivated violence 
was simply a matter of family and criminal law and could therefore not 
be addressed by Congress’ power to regulate commerce.257  Because the 
Court in Morrison also drew a firm line on requiring state action to 
enforce the Equal Protection Clause,258 after Lopez259 and Morrison, 
Congress’ power to address private discrimination was limited to 
prohibiting discriminatory activity that the Court defines as economic.260 
 
 253. See Pope, supra note 6, at 116 (arguing that if the New Deal Era Congress had relied on 
the Thirteenth Amendment, rather than the commerce power, to enact protective labor legislation, 
there would have been no need “to inflate the commerce clause beyond recognition,” and Congress’ 
human rights powers might have escaped “permanent truncation.”). 
 254. See Post & Siegel, supra note 6; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 76; Jed Rubenfeld, The 
Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002).  That this is an area of almost 
universal agreement is evident from the paucity of scholarship arguing that states, and not the 
federal government, are better suited to protect civil rights.  See David J. Barron, The Promise of 
Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487 (1999); Nelson Lund, 
Federalism and Civil Liberties, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1045 (1997). 
 255. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 256. Thus, in Morrison the Court reaffirmed the determination to limit the commerce power 
that it expressed in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), while at the same time continuing 
to apply the nineteenth century limits on Congress’ human rights powers, in the form of the state 
action requirement from The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  See Pope, supra note 6, at 6. 
 257. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 258. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621. 
 259. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 260. Resnik, supra note 8. 
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The second barrier to Congress’ power to enact civil rights 
legislation is that the Court has greatly reduced Congress’ power under 
Section five to enforce the Equal Protection Clause with its 
“congruence” and “proportionality” test of City of Boerne v. Flores.261  
This test makes it difficult for Congress to enable private parties to sue 
states for discriminating against them because in Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida,262 the Court held that Congress cannot use its commerce power 
to abrogate state’s immunity to suits by private parties, leaving Section 
five as the only source of congressional power to abrogate sovereign 
immunity.263 
On its own, Seminole Tribe already creates a significant barrier to 
Congress making a state accountable for discrimination.  But the true 
impact of Seminole Tribe was not apparent until the Court applied 
Boerne to the civil rights legislation enacted since the 1960s, which is 
based on Congress’ power to enforce Section five as well as the 
commerce power.  In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. 
Garrett264 and Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,265 the Court held that 
Congress’ Section five power did not extend to legislation prohibiting 
discrimination based on disability and age, respectively, categories that 
the Court itself has not identified as meriting heightened equal protection 
scrutiny.266  The Court’s narrow reading of Congress’ Section five power 
in Kimel and Garrett have virtually disabled Congress from abrogating 
sovereign immunity and making states accountable for their 
discriminatory actions. 
Ironically, the statutes at issue in Kimel and Garrett, the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act and the American’s with Disabilities 
Act, respectively, remain good law because Congress also based them on 
its commerce power and both statutes regulate economic activity.  
However, those statutes are now unenforceable against state actors by 
private parties, and therefore are essentially limited to addressing private 
discrimination.267  Thus, the Court has created a strange dichotomy—
 
 261. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 262. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 263. The Court had earlier held that Congress can abrogate states’ sovereign immunity with 
legislation based on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 
(1976). 
 264. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 265. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 266. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370-72; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86-87. 
 267. The federal government can still sue states to enforce the ADA and the ADEA.  See 
generally Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).  However, given the limited 
resources of the federal government, direct federal enforcement of civil rights statutes is not a viable 
alternative for most individuals who remain formally protected by those statutes.  See Zietlow, 
43
Zietlow: Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003
NEWZEITLOW.DOC 7/28/03  11:50 AM 
760 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:717 
Congress can address only private (and not state) discrimination in the 
economic realm, and Congress cannot address private discrimination in 
non-economic realms. 
There are also some more subtle pitfalls of Congress’ reliance on 
the commerce power to enact civil rights legislation, illustrated in the 
Court’s recent rulings of Morrison, Kimel and Garrett.  Congress’ 
reliance on the connection of the regulated activity to interstate 
commerce, instead of the connection of that activity to the principles of 
belonging, protection and equality from the rights of citizenship, has 
enabled the Court to require all civil rights legislation that addresses 
private activity to be economic in nature, reducing its potential to protect 
human rights.  In Morrison, the Court struck down the civil rights 
provision of the Violence Against Women Act268 because it did not 
regulate economic activity.269  Congress had identified that provision as 
a civil rights remedy,270 but the Court didn’t believe Congress.  The 
Court saw the remedy as a family law remedy, thus beyond federal 
power altogether.271  With regard to state action, on the other hand, civil 
rights legislation that only addresses economic activity is not enough.  
Once the Court views the regulated activity as economic, it appears to 
discount the human rights protecting nature of that legislation, thus 
finding it beyond Congress’ Section five power.  Thus, in Kimel and 
Garrett, the Court appears to view the ADEA and ADA as only 
economic based, and not human rights based, legislation. 272 
 
supra note 237, at 207-08. 
 268. 42 U.S.C. § 13981. 
 269. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (determining “[g]ender-motivated 
crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”)  In so ruling, the Court 
disregarded numerous congressional findings linking gender motivated violence to interstate 
commerce.  See Resnik, supra note 8, at 630-33 (2001) (arguing that the Court both ignored the 
extensive congressional record showing the connection between gender-motivated violence and 
interstate commerce, and reinforced the stereotype of women as belonging outside the economic 
realm.). 
 270. The provision was entitled a “civil rights remedy” and created a federal cause of action 
against any person “who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives 
another of the right [to be free from that violence].”  42 U.S.C. §13981.  In both language and 
purpose, §13981 mirrored the Ku Klux Klan Act of the Reconstruction Era, 42 U.S.C. §1985, which 
prohibited conspiracies by “any person” to use violence to interfere with the exercise of the rights of 
citizenship.  See supra note 158 and accompanying text.  See also Resnik, supra note 8, at 642 
(arguing Congress had identified violence against women as a national problem, meriting a federal 
remedy). 
 271. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613-16.  See Resnik, supra note 8, at 619 (critiquing the 
Court’s categorical approach in Morrison). 
 272. See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 518. 
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B.  Overcoming the Barriers? 
Thus, the Court has recently created barriers to Congress’ power to 
address both private and state discrimination.  On the one hand, the 
Court has restricted Congress’ use of its commerce power to address 
private discrimination because it views that power as unduly threatening 
to state sovereignty.273  On the other hand, the Court has restricted 
Congress’ use of Section five to address state discrimination because it 
sees that power as unduly threatening to its own role as interpreter of the 
Constitution.274  The Citizenship Clause could address both concerns, if 
interpreted consistently with Bingham’s theory of citizenship. 
1.  Addressing Private Discrimination 
The Court has cut back on the commerce power because it sees that 
power as overly threatening to state sovereignty.  Without any limiting 
principles, the Court feared that the commerce power could become a 
general federal police power.275  However, if Congress relied on the 
Citizenship Clause and the rights of federal citizenship rather than the 
Commerce Clause to enact civil rights legislation such as the ADA and 
the ADEA, it could have created a source of rights with a limiting 
principle—protecting the rights of federal citizens to belong to a national 
community as equal citizens.276  Moreover, if Congress had based the 
civil rights provision of the Violence Against Women Act on its power 
to protect federal citizenship rights,277 then it might have been harder for 
the Court to re-categorize the law as a family law that encroached on the 
traditional province of the states.278  In John Bingham’s vision of 
 
 273. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Post & Siegel, supra 
note 6. 
 274. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 
(2000); Post & Siegel, supra note 6. 
 275. See generally Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 276. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 76, at 1099 (“In our view Congress has the power to 
pass laws that protect the equal citizenship of Americans.”). 
 277. I have argued elsewhere that Congress could have done so, since providing victims of 
gender motivated violence access to federal courts fits well within the paradigm of belonging, 
protection and equality that identifies citizenship rights.  See Zietlow, supra note 7, at 328-29. 
 278. Of course, it is very possible that the Court would have applied its own categorical 
approach and identified § 13981 as a family law provision no matter what source of power Congress 
purported to rely on.  Jed Rubenfeld has recently argued that the Court’s rulings in the cases 
discussed in this article are motivated by an anti-discrimination agenda.  See Rubenfeld, supra note 
253.  If so, it could be futile to search for an alternate source of congressional power to enact civil 
rights legislation.  However, given the Court’s recent receptive attitude towards federal citizenship 
rights in other cases, those rights seem the most promising source of law to alter this Court’s 
direction regarding anti-discrimination laws. 
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citizenship rights, states still retained the power to bestow rights upon 
their citizens, but federal citizenship would provide the standard as a 
baseline of rights that could not be taken away.279  This overlapping 
theory of jurisdiction is considerably less threatening to states than the 
general police power potential of the commerce power. 
The Court’s opinion in the Civil Rights Cases280 may pose an 
obstacle to this approach.  In that case, the Court held that the 1875 Civil 
Rights Act281 fell beyond Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment because that power was limited to remedying state action.  
In dicta, the Court used language that could be interpreted to limit 
Congress’ power to enforce citizenship rights.282  Moreover, the Court 
did not distinguish between provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
that ruling.  However, in subsequent rulings, the Court has only followed 
the Civil Rights Cases when interpreting Congress’ power to enforce the 
Equal Protection Clause.283  Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, the 
Citizenship Clause does not contain the prefatory phrase “no state 
shall.”284  Moreover, because of the structural nature of federal 
citizenship rights, which are directly linked to the relationship between 
the state and federal government, citizenship rights might not be limited 
by the state action requirement. 
In United States v. Guest,285 the Court ruled that the state action 
requirement did not limit Congress’ power to protect the rights of 
citizenship.286 In Guest, the Court upheld the indictment of private 
individuals for conspiring to prevent a person from using state facilities 
because of his race, thereby interfering with his right to engage in 
interstate travel.287  The Court treated the right to travel differently than 
the other equal protection rights at issue in the case, noting that “[t]he 
 
 279. See Fox, supra note 80, at 134, citing Michael P. Zuckert, Congressional Power Under 
the Fourteenth Amendment—The Original Understanding of Section Five, 3 CONST. COMM. 123, 
141 (1986). 
 280. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 281. 18 Stat. 335 (1975). 
 282. Id.  The Court said that the legislation which Congress is authorized to adopt under the 
Fourteenth Amendment “is not general legislation upon the rights of citizen. . . .”  Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. at 13-14. 
 283. See, e.g., U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 284. Of course, this argument only works if the Citizenship Clause is enforceable separately 
from the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which does contain the prefatory “no state shall” 
language, and does appear to be limited to state action. 
 285. U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
 286. Id.  The Guest Court reserved the issue of whether Congress could reach private action 
when enforcing the equal protection clause.  Id. 
 287. Id. at 760.  But see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 679-80 (distinguishing Guest on the grounds 
that some state official was involved in the private activity at issue in Guest). 
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constitutional right to travel from one State to another . . . occupies a 
position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”288  The Court 
then emphasized the structural nature of the right to travel, pointing out 
“it is important to reiterate that the right to travel freely . . . finds 
constitutional protection that is quite independent of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”289  The structural nature of the right to travel is the reason 
that the Court also stated, “the constitutional right of interstate travel is a 
right secured against interference from any source whatever, whether 
governmental or private.”290  Thus, in Guest the Court found that the 
federal government is able to enforce rights of federal citizenship against 
private parties if those rights are inherent in the structure of the federal 
government.291 
Similarly, in Griffin v. Breckenridge, a unanimous Court ruled that 
42 U.S.C. §1985(3), a Reconstruction Era civil rights statute which 
provided a civil remedy for victims of private conspiracies aimed at 
depriving them “of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal 
privileges and immunities under the laws . . . (or) of having or exercising 
any right of privilege of a citizen of the United States,” was not limited 
by state action.292  The Court’s ruling in Griffin expressed a particularly 
broad reading of congressional power to address private deprivations of 
federal rights.293  The Court stated “that there is nothing inherent in the 
phrase [equal protection of the laws] that requires the action working the 
deprivation to come from the state”294 and opined further that Congress’ 
failure to insert any “state action” requirement into section 1985(3) 
indicated its intent to reach “all deprivations of ‘equal protection of the 
laws’ . . . whatever their source.”295  The Court held that §1985(3) fell 
 
 288. Guest, 383 U.S. at 757. 
 289. Id. at 759 n.17. 
 290. Id. 
 291. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1047, 1940 (1994). 
 292. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 96-97 (1971). 
 293. See Estreicher, supra note 108, at 498: (citing The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. 
L. REV. 3, 100 (1971)) (arguing that “[i]n effect, Griffin could be read to transform the Bill of 
Rights protections into a ‘federal common law against [private] racial conspiracies.’”). 
 294. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 97. 
 295. The Court limited the breadth of its ruling somewhat by noting that §1985(3) applied only 
to conspiracies motivated by “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously 
discriminatory animus. . . .”  Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102.  In Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health 
Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993), the Court again declined to precisely define the meaning of “class” for 
the purposes of §1985(3), but stated that “the term unquestionably connotes something more than a 
group of individuals who share a desire to engage in conduct that the §1985(3) defendant 
disfavors.”  Bray, 506 U.S. at 275.  The Court was concerned that otherwise the statute would be 
turned into a “general federal tort law.”  Id. 
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within Congress’ power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment but also 
noted that the right to travel, “like other rights of national citizenship,” is 
“assertable against private as well as government interference.”296 
Finally, there is an interesting parallel between the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which does not require state action, and the Citizenship 
Clause.297  Many members of the 39th Congress believed that the 
Thirteenth Amendment had the effect of making former slaves 
citizens.298  This connection is reflected in the fact that a vast majority of 
Republicans believed that the Thirteenth Amendment gave them the 
power to enact the 1866 Civil Rights Act, with its Citizenship Clause 
and protection for the rights of citizenship.299  The Supreme Court has 
held that Congress’ power to address private discrimination in real estate 
transactions fell within its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power.300  
Similarly, the right to own property was one of the principle rights of 
citizenship recognized by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.301  
The connection between the Citizenship Clause and the Thirteenth 
Amendment  provides further support for the argument that Congress’ 
power to define and protect citizenship rights is not limited to state 
action.302 
 
 296. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105-06.  The plaintiffs had asserted that they were deprived of “their 
rights to travel the public highways without restraint in the same terms as white citizens in Kemper 
County, Mississippi.”  Griffin, 403 U.S. at 106. 
 297. The Thirteenth Amendment states affirmatively, “Neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall 
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”  U.S. CONST. amd. XIII 
(emphasis added).  It was directed primarily at ending the private ownership of slaves. 
 298. Thanks to Richard Aynes for pointing this parallel out to me. 
 299. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text. 
 300. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (upholding the constitutionality of 
42 U.S.C. §1982).  The Court has also found that 42 U.S.C. §1981, which prohibits race 
discrimination in private contracts, falls within Congress’ power to enforce the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  In both cases, the Court ruled that the legislation was justified by Congress’ power to 
remedy the “badges and incidents” of slavery.  Significantly the Petitioners in Jones had argued that 
§1982 was justified by Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment as well.  The Court 
sidestepped that determination, which would probably have required it to revisit its ruling in the 
Civil Rights Cases, and upheld the statute solely on the basis of the Thirteenth Amendment 
enforcement powers.  See Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 496. 
 301. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. 
 302. Although the Thirteenth Amendment is conventionally considered to only address 
“badges and incidents of slavery,” some lawmakers and reformers have considered it to be a source 
of a much wider range of laws protecting individual rights.  For example, labor leaders in the first 
half of the Twentieth Century argued forcefully that the Thirteenth Amendment was a source of 
congressional power to enact protective labor legislation.  See generally Pope, supra note 6.  In 
addition, the Justice Department under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt developed a wide 
ranging litigation strategy for enforcing the Thirteenth Amendment as a vehicle for instituting “free 
labor” and prohibiting various kinds of legal and economic coercion.  See generally Risa Goluboff, 
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The Court’s rulings in Guest and Griffin, that state action is not 
required for Congress to protect federal citizenship rights, suggest that 
citizenship rights may still provide a font of congressional power to 
address private violations of those rights, notwithstanding the Court’s 
ruling in the Civil Rights Cases.  More recently, in United States v. 
Morrison, the Court relied on the Civil Rights Cases when it held that 
Congress could not use its Section five power to enforce the Equal 
Protection Clause to reach actions of private parties.303  In Morrison¸ the 
Court appears to have hardened its stance on the state action requirement 
and the opinion could be interpreted to limit all Section five based 
legislation addressing state action.  However, Morrison, like the Civil 
Rights Cases, involved legislation based on the Equal Protection Clause.  
It might be possible to distinguish the ruling from congressional 
enforcement of citizenship rights on that basis. 
2.  Addressing State Discrimination 
The Court has cut back on congressional power to enforce equal 
protection rights under Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because it sees that power as unduly threatening to the institutional role 
of the Court.  Like equal protection rights, citizenship rights are clearly 
enforceable against the states pursuant to Section five.  Whether or not 
Congress’ use of the citizenship power could overcome the restrictive 
barriers imposed by the Court in Kimel304 and Garrett305 will depend on 
how the Court would apply the congruence and proportionality test of 
Boerne v. Flores306 to congressional enforcement of citizenship rights.  
For several reasons, it is possible that the Court might act more 
deferentially towards Congress’ use of its citizenship power than it has 
towards Congress’ use of its power to enforce the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
In Boerne the Court held that legislation enforcing Section five 
must be congruent and proportional to the constitutional violation being 
remedied.307  That is, Court said that Congress can’t create rights that 
would not otherwise be found in the Constitution.  In Garrett and Kimel, 
the Court applied the Boerne test stringently, holding that the ADA and 
the ADEA are beyond congressional enforcement power because they 
 
The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L. J. 1209 (2001). 
 303. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 304. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 305. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 306. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 307. Boerne, 521 U.S. 507. 
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give plaintiffs more rights than they would otherwise have if they sued 
directly under the Equal Protection Clause.  In earlier rulings, the Court 
had held that both age and disability based classifications are subject to 
rational basis review, requiring only a legitimate government purpose to 
justify a distinction based on those categories.308  According to the 
Court, when Congress prohibited discrimination based on age and 
disability in the ADEA and the ADA, respectively, it effectively 
heightened the level of scrutiny given to distinctions based on those 
characteristics in a manner that was inconsistent with the Court’s 
treatment of those categories.309  This approach violated the congruence 
and proportionality test of Boerne and was therefore beyond 
congressional power under Section five. 
Notwithstanding the Court’s rulings in Kimel and Garrett, the 
Court might feel less threatened by congressional interpretation of the 
citizenship power than it is with congressional interpretation of the equal 
protection power.  Since Brown v. Board of Education,310 the Court has 
carefully developed an equal protection jurisprudence in numerous 
cases, interpreting Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect 
the interests of “discrete and insular minorities” and developing a system 
of differing levels of scrutiny depending on whether those claiming 
Section one protection were “discrete and insular minorities,” as defined 
by the Court.311  In contrast to equal protection, the Court has not 
developed a clear “citizenship” jurisprudence.  The Court has never 
interpreted the meaning of the Citizenship Clause, and it has only 
considered what a right of citizenship might be in a handful of cases.312  
Therefore, it is possible that the Court’s application of the “congruence 
and proportionality” test to legislation enforcing the rights of citizens 
 
 308. See Clerburne v. Clerburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). 
 309. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).  Congress’ attempt to heighten scrutiny is particularly clear with 
respect to the Americans with Disabilities Act, in which Congress declared that people with 
disabilities are “discrete and insular minorities” meriting heightened governmental protection. 
 310. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 311. See, e.g., U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 fn.4 (1938) (distinguishing 
cases in which greater judicial scrutiny might be appropriate, including situations where prejudice 
against “discrete and insular minorities” may be a factor).  See also Clerburne, 473 U.S. 432 
(classifications based on disability merit rational basis scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 
(1976) (gender based classifications merit “intermediate” scrutiny); Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (age 
based classifications merit rational basis scrutiny); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (poverty 
based classifications merit rational basis scrutiny); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) 
(race based classifications merit strict scrutiny). 
 312. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text. 
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might be more deferential, allowing that legislation to withstand the 
Court’s scrutiny. 
Moreover, the current Supreme Court recently indicated a 
receptivity to the Fourteenth Amendment’s values of citizenship in its 
ruling in two cases, Saenz v. Roe313 and U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton.314  In Saenz, the Court struck down a California state welfare 
law as violating the right to travel imbedded in the citizenship provisions 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.315  Significantly, the Court in Saenz cited 
both the majority and dissenting opinions in The Slaughter-House Cases 
to support its ruling.316In Term Limits, the Court found that states cannot 
set limits on the terms of federal representatives because those limits 
interfere with the relationship between federal citizens and their 
representatives.317  The rights of federal citizenship played a key role in 
both cases, which stand in remarkable contrast to the Court’s many 
recent rulings against federal power because of its intrusion on state 
sovereignty.318  This contrast has led this author to argue elsewhere that 
the rights of federal citizenship may set the limits on this Court’s 
federalism.319  If so, that approach would be consistent with Bingham’s 
theory of citizenship.  Although neither Saenz nor Term Limits address 
the issues of congressional enforcement of the rights of citizenship, 
those rulings indicate that this Court is receptive to those rights and they 
should encourage congressional proponents of those rights today. 
C.  A Cautionary Note 
No discussion of the rights of citizenship would be complete 
without noting the potential of citizenship to be an exclusionary, rather 
than an inclusionary, concept.320  This is particularly worrisome in light 
of the current federal government’s response to terrorism, in which it has 
rounded up numerous non-citizens for interrogation without apparent 
reason other than their nationality.  Moreover, even before September 
11, 2001, in the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996,321 Congress made 
 
 313. 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
 314. 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 315. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 503-04. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 783. 
 318. See Zietlow, supra note 7, at 296-300. 
 319. Id. at 296. 
 320. Rogers Smith has written as great deal about this danger.  See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 19.  
See also Fox, supra note 49, at 443 (discussing “tiered and exclusionary” aspects of citizenship). 
 321. Personal responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconsiliation Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1600, et. 
seq. (1996). 
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numerous distinctions based on citizenship, denying the basic survival 
benefits of food stamps and welfare benefits to non-citizens who are 
legally residing in this country.  Fortunately, Congress has since 
abolished those discriminatory measures, but the danger of future 
discrimination and exclusion clearly remains. 
The author is mindful of the exclusionary effect potentially 
resulting from the Court’s reliance on citizenship as a source of rights.  
Although aliens are considered to be “persons” protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a whole,322 a court or a member of Congress 
could find that they are excluded from the protection of the Citizenship 
Clause.323  The exclusionary aspect of citizenship is evident in the view 
of citizenship of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the 
social compact theory that predominated at the time required allegiance 
to the government in exchange for its protection.324  According to this 
theory of republican citizenship, only citizens are truly members of 
society and entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizenship.325 
John Bingham’s view of citizenship was arguably somewhat 
exclusionary.  For example, one of the reasons he opposed the admission 
of Oregon as a state was because Oregon allowed non-citizens to vote.  
Bingham believed that the franchise should be limited to citizens.326  
Similarly, Representative Wilson explained an amendment to the 1866 
Civil Rights Act,327 replacing the word “inhabitants,” in the original 
draft, with the word “citizens of the United States” on the grounds that 
“[t]his amendment is intended to confine the operation of this bill to 
citizens of the United States, instead of extending it to the inhabitants of 
the several states.”328  On the other hand, Bingham opposed the 
amendment because of the exclusionary potential of the latter word.  He 
stated: 
If this is to be the language of the bill, by enacting it are we not 
 
 322. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886). 
 323. See Bosniak, supra note 290, at 1087 (pointing out that the United States laws regarding 
the protection of the rights of aliens in the United States is “striking in its apparent capriciousness”). 
 324. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 630-31 (1866) (Representative Hubbard) 
(describing the 1866 Civil Rights Bill: “It is intended to cast the shield of protection over four 
million American citizens, including old men, young men, and women and children. . . .  We owe 
them protection in return for their faithful allegiance.”); Smith, supra note 13, at 730-31. 
 325. Id. 
 326. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 982 (1859) (Representative Bingham) (arguing that 
the elective franchise for the election of federal officers should be confined to citizens of the United 
States.  States can not confer rights of citizenship on aliens). 
 327. 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 
 328. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115 (1866). 
52
Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 4, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss4/5
NEWZEITLOW.DOC 7/28/03  11:50 AM 
2003] CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS 769 
committing the terrible enormity of distinguishing here in the laws in 
respect of life, liberty and property, between the citizen and stranger 
within your gates? . . . Sir, that is forbidden by the Constitution of your 
country.  The great men who made that instrument, when they 
undertook to make provision, by limitations upon the power of this 
government for the security by the universal rights of man, abolished 
the narrow and limited phrase of the old Magna Carta, which gave the 
protection of the laws only to “free men” and inserted in the words “no 
person,” thereby obeying that higher law given by a voice out of 
heaven: “Ye shall have the same law for the stranger as for one of your 
own country.”329 
Bingham’s impassioned speech shows that his vision was not 
entirely exclusionary.  The belief of Bingham and many other Framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment that people had certain fundamental rights 
that warranted protection by the government reflects the other side of the 
American tradition of citizenship—the inclusionary nature of our nation 
of immigrants.  As professor Kenneth Karst has commented,  “[e]quality 
and belonging are inseparably linked; to define the scope of the ideal of 
equality in America is to define the boundaries of the national 
community.”330  Even, the Supreme Court has been willing to blur the 
lines between citizens and non-citizens even in finding individual rights 
where citizenship was an important factor.  For example, the Court 
emphasized the connection between education and citizenship in the 
case of Plyler v. Doe,331 even as it ruled in favor of the non-citizen 
plaintiffs and found that they had a right to state funding of their public 
education.  The Court’s ruling in Plyler indicates that citizenship-based 
rights need not be exclusionary in scope.  The author is hopeful that 
members of Congress would follow the Court’s lead in Plyler  when 
legislating the rights of citizenship. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Citizenship Clause and the rights of federal 
citizenship remain a fertile source of congressional power to enact civil 
rights legislation even after Morrison, Kimel and Garrett.  It’s time to 
revitalize Bingham’s vision of citizenship so that Congress can still 
define and protect our rights in the Twenty-first Century. 
 
 329. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (1858). 
 330. KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 2 (1989).  See also Forbath, supra note 
215 (discussing progressive vision of citizenship rights). 
 331. 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). 
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